Have I thrown down the “Don’t Say Utility Challenge” recently? Because I really think that’s one thing that might help some understand the tricky wordplay in neoclassical welfare economics and hence also anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style.
If you follow my writing at all, you’ll know I propose there is one reason and one reason only economists refer to individual preference ranks using the term “utility,” and that is to mislead and confuse people by engaging in a game of terminological equivocation for rhetorical purposes. I propose anyone teaching, reading, discussing modern neoclassical welfare economics replace the word “utility” with the phrase “preference rank of individual X” or the equivalent. They’re meant to be identical concepts in modern formulations of neoclassical welfare economics.
To follow my post this week, one must reject the insincere rhetorical jape one hears from bad economists that “utility” in neoclassical economics is undefined, can mean many things or whatever one likes. Yes, in philosophy many proposed definitions. In economics, only a couple of definitions work. I’m talking here about so-called “preference rank utility” in which “utility” refers only to an individual’s preference ranking, which is the conventional modern interpretation. There is an older version, “perceptions of satisfaction from preference fulfillment” I’ll mention in a bit.
The main point of interest about “preference rank utility” is that it cannot be meaningfully used in interpersonal contexts because there is no shared individual preference ranking, no shared “utility.” It doesn’t make sense to ask questions like, “Who gets more utility from good G, person 1 or 2?” Or “What is the total utility across person 1 and 2 for good G?” Nor does it make sense to talk about attaching “weights” to one person’s preference ranking, then adding it to another’s. One could make that obvious enough if one stopped using the term “utility,” which in many common interpretations in ethical philosophy may be used in interpersonal contexts, and just used the equivalent statement “preference rank of individual X” or the equivalent. What is the term “utility” meant to be adding beyond a hook on which to hang terminological equivocation and create confusion? An individual preference rank is not of use for some other end in the way goods and services were once meant to be of use or have utility in producing happiness.
Now let’s take up the other, older definition that also works, because I know where some minds are likely going, in the rhetorical circles one associates with bad economics. Say we don’t equate “utility” with individual preference ranks, merely such ranks are the only indicator of something else? Something else? Like what? Happiness? How about the most general formulation of inner, inaccessible states of satisfaction from preference fulfillment to avoid the implication preference ranking must be based on hedonistic happiness but can remain general, not disputable, as theory requires? Fine. Then go ahead and say “utility.” One can see in that case there may be some point in using the term beyond rhetorical chicanery. But as Detective Colombo might remark, I have just a few questions in that case.
One might raise positive issues of course, but let’s cut to the chase and talk about the normative proposition we should maximize “utility.” So one person has a lot more inner sensations of satisfaction than others. Whatever that person wants, that person gets, never mind others. Is that it? And here I must give credit to one of my old economics professors who, obviously using this older definition of “utility,” tried to impress upon a class of listless undergrads how important it was we can’t measure utility, how horrible it would be if we could really maximize social utility. Who would seriously support such an ethical proposition? As far as ethical utilitarianism, it must be the most laughably weak and implausible version around. No one would seriously consider it ethically important or even ethical to implement such a proposition.
Cue the conservative rhetorician chorus, “But that’s the whole point, no one could ever implement it.” So pretend to support a totally implausible ethical proposition because one believes no one could ever implement it? Does it sound sincere to you? Or does it sound misleading rhetoric? Does it sound like they may be just trying to eliminate discussion of more serious ethical utilitarianism in interpersonal contexts in order to set the stage to introduce their own interpersonal ethics? Or to oppose interpersonal ethics, in general? How about if they then proceed to offer normative advice relating to economic policies, objectives, goals that have interpersonal implications? I’m just saying. You’re sure you want to commit to that definition? Not waffle back and forth, equivocate?
My challenge to academic economists: If you mean individual preference ranks only, stop saying “utility.” If you mean inner perceptions of satisfaction, stop claiming you’re doing “individual preference rank utility” and explain why you think that definition of “utility” is ethically plausible. I mean, explain in a rigorous philosophical sense, including the awkward bits. And please not just with the risible line, “I don’t support it, and nor will I defend it; I’m just working out the implications in case anyone else supports it for whatever old reason.” That’s not how it’s used.
If you’re a student, ask for a definition, clarification if you detect linguistic anomalies such as individual preference rank utility discussed in interpersonal contexts or inner state utility discussed as individual preference rank utility. If using the latter, think about the ethics.
