Gender Differences In Bad Economics In The Conservative Style

Speaking of conflating normative and positive issues, I read a post referencing a bit of old popular folklore about women being “too emotional” to handle certain tasks and it got me thinking about bad economics in the conservative style. Let’s do that this week.

The post I read drew attention to the highly emotional discourse common among male, conservative, right wing pundits and politicians in the USA to challenge the notion women vary systematically from men in terms of emotionality. Seemed a valid point. That in turn got me thinking of a comical image from the world of economics broadly conceived involving male conservative economists and pundits “mansplaining” bad economics in the conservative style to skeptical women, then complaining women are just too emotional to get it. I’m not presenting documentary evidence such a thing ever occurred. I’m speaking from general experience, impressions, now perhaps dated to some degree. If you suppose it doesn’t happen, it’s not a real issue, maybe consider the issue in terms of a rare but possible occurrence?

In the context of bad economics in the conservative style, the fundamental conceit is the dubious, controversial normative, ethical content slipped into neoclassical welfare economics is just a matter of science, math, logic, etc., so if one disagrees, one is being “emotional.” The reality, of course, is one who disagrees is simply evaluating the surreptitiously added normative, ethical material according to one’s subjective moral sense or sensibility, like anyone else, and finding it lacking. Relatively emotionality is not an issue. Of course, the insincere, misleading, opaque, tricksy nature of how normative, ethical issues are handled in bad economics in the conservative style may generate an angry or frustrated emotional response, which may be selectively apparent in those who disagree with the rhetoric. But in that case the implied task one objecting to bad economics in the conservative style would be too emotional to handle would be the task of listening to an insincere or confused charlatan “mansplaining” bad philosophy. Not a task one should be expected to accept, is it? Also, in that area, one might expect a similarly emotional response in those who promote bad economics in the conservative style when they're called out on the fakery, insincerity, falseness of their handling of the relevant normative or ethical content.

To link normative evaluation to the proposed gender issue, I suppose one would have to hypothesize an underlying gender difference in the evaluation of the implicit normative or ethical content in bad economics in the conservative style or in the need for sincerity or honesty. Is it plausible to suggest such a difference? Well, I don’t know. I think maybe yes? Based on systematically different life experience of males and females, including but not only in the context of family, child rearing, etc.? At the risk of being excessively blunt, I suppose it may appear systematically more ethically plausible to males one should accept amorality or a morality based in egoism, ignoring the needs of others and society, than to females. If that were the case, the distinctive normative or ethical content slipped into neoclassical welfare economics in anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style may lead to normative or ethical conclusions that seem systematically more attractive to males than females. This would then lead to females tending to reject bad economics in the conservative style even without pinpointing the little rhetorical tricks involved, which males who support that normative theory might then falsely cast as an instance of “emotion” overruling reason.

Because of the scientific pretensions of many economists, gender issues in the field of economics are often discussed in the context of positive economics in terms of differential interest in, or facility with, math, logic, science, etc. I wonder if they may be more usefully discussed, or anyway also usefully discussed, in the context of the evaluation of specifically normative economics, real (normative) neoclassical welfare economics, bad economics in the conservative style. 

Egoism and Conservatism

I was thinking the other day about the fundamental significance of anti-social egoism for right wing, conservative ideology, and not only in the context of bad economics in the conservative style. I thought I might say a few words on that this week.

I propose humanity is fundamentally a social species. We gain our power from our ability to form society, the word, communication, collaboration, coordination, the transmission of knowledge, technology, social organization, ethics, government, law, etc. Humans may be able to survive in isolation when necessary, having learned nothing from anyone nor passing anything along to anyone, neither being helped by others nor helping others, finding no need for communication. But it’s an unusual, extreme situation for a human. However, humans are also egoistic to some degree and generally desire some realm in which their own egoistic desires, interests may prevail. Attaining that balance is at the core of the human experience involving ethics, society, especially liberal political thought. 

Right wing conservatism represents an unbalanced, myopic fascination with the ego, in which any check or impediment on the ego arising from consideration of others, society, ethics, law, government becomes anathema, an affront to one’s freedom, liberty, and so on. One sees it in the “greed is good” ethical proposition from anti-democracy bad economic in the conservative style, which falsely proposes neoclassical welfare economics establishes ethically optimal social relations will follow if everyone acts egoistically, ignores ethics. One sees it in racism, where one’s “race” is meant to grant one’s ego added weight and significance, and in bad religion, where a conception of “god” made in one’s own image is meant to grant special status to one’s ego, puff it up, make it grand. One sees it in support for violent, lawless anarchism, with the insistence one always be free to do as one likes, including resolving interpersonal conflicts in whatever way works to one’s advantage, such as at the end of a gun, ignoring all others. One sees it in support for fascism, which at least in its heady early days is about the promise of forcing one’s own views on others using sympathetic government force, rejecting the social discussion of ethics and determination of law, rejecting the ethos of democracy. One sees it in support for inaptly named “social” Darwinism, usually about some notion of “fitness” defined with respect to the individual, the ego, not the fitness of society, the “fittest” of which may involve altruism, a point seemingly lost on Herr Nietzsche and his ilk. One sees it in the general conservative inability to appreciate the value of human diversity at a social level, to understand why, say, homosexuality may persist in a social species even as it conveys no genetic advantage to a particular individual.

It’s in the collision of that egoism and the social nature of humanity that right wing ideology gets most interesting. Because in the end the intellectual artifacts of conservatism, such as fascism, religion, etc., can only express the ego of some, not all. Someone must submit. It’s that selling to egoists of submission that leads to the difficulties of late-stage fascism and religion, where the early triumph of the will for the many becomes narrowed to the few and the surrender of the will for the many, the slavish minions, the followers. It’s at that crucial stage an egoist either surrenders to another, grants it mastery, becomes a slave, attaches egoistic pride to serving another, or finally comes to see the fundamental difficulty involved and perhaps to appreciate the rigors of ethics, society, democracy.

In the final days of Nazism, some fascists famously killed themselves, but was it is because they considered the avatar of their own ego thwarted, or because they could conceive of no purpose in life beyond slavish servitude to the ego of the great and ostensibly merit-filled? Or, indeed, did simply maintaining their egoism in a small way to survive, thrive, under the conditions of fascist authoritarian rule by others lead them to make ethical choices they later found psychologically and philosophically unsupportable, incompatible with living? Other erstwhile fascists, of course, rejoiced at the fall of Nazism, albeit usually meekly, quietly. They had long since seen the fundamental problem of the hell their own egoism had wrought, but were too afraid, too weak to escape or fight that system once established.

And so with religion, now mostly a matter of egoistically shopping for a religion or sect that expresses one’s views but was formerly a hotly contested matter of state control, law, formal hierarchy, and cruel violence over whose vision, interpretation, ego would be enforced. Historically, some happily gave up their lives for the religious expression of their egos, some to slavishly follow the egos of others, others were only too happy to replace the iron grip of state religion with personal freedom, the expression of the ego in a small way. Indeed, some were likely only too happy to evade the need to perform what they inwardly considered unethical acts in the name of established religion, which once established they performed to satisfy the fundamental requirements of the modest ego, survival, advancement, etc.

And so with anarchism, where the early promise of the ego unchained by society, consideration of others, leads typically directly to the domination of the many by the few through violent intimidation, and thus to renewed interest of the many in ethics, society, law, government.

We all have egos, ideas, desires, preferences, values, ethical beliefs. But there are advantages to living in a human society with others who have those things as well. Think about it seriously sometime, and one may finally understand the strength and beauty of democracy. Think you’ve found a way to have all the advantages of human society but always have one’s way, enforce one’s will on others, prevail in every interpersonal conflict? You haven’t. It doesn’t exist. Get real or suffer the consequences, as have so many others in our sad history.

Left and Right

Here’s a question for you: do you know your left from your right, politically, economically? How about your far left from your far right? I suspect there may be some issues, terminological complications, confusion. Maybe we can discuss that a bit this week?

I suppose the most common definition of left and right must involve reference to ethical views on the definition, distribution, use of economic power to resolve interpersonal conflicts of preferences, allocate resources, etc. The exact specifications of the respective views may be a little contentious but generally one is more about defined and unchangeable property laws; labor and capital market, inheritance based distribution of economic power; extensive use of markets; and the other less so. From this perspective on left and right, one can have extreme positions of either left or right involving non-democratic, authoritarian expressions of the relevant ethics on economic power, so right wing authoritarian fascism versus left wing authoritarian communism. This traditional take allows one to easily make sense of the historical deadly animosity between similarly anti-democracy, authoritarian, ostensibly (although not necessarily genuinely) “welfare state” fascism and communism in 20th century Europe especially. 

Democracy, from this perspective, is neither inherently right nor left, as voters can voice opinions on the ethics of economic power and can and will revise, amend change those opinions, evolve. Voters often support a “welfare state” stance but they needn’t and sometimes haven’t. It’s rare, but voters in a democracy sometimes support a government that evinces no care or sense of responsibility relating to the welfare or well-being of the citizenry, as in the early years of the Great Depression of the 1930s, for example. 

Under this perspective, one may say the USA currently has a very popular, powerful, influential, well-funded, far right political movement in the form of the conservative movement and the Republican Party, but no real far left movement to speak of. That is to say, one can find anti-democracy, authoritarian, violent, political rhetoric from right wing conservatives, Republicans, but no real anti-democracy, authoritarian, violent, political rhetoric from their opponents, liberals, Democrats.

However, there is another version of the left right distinction in which democracy, by casting the ethics of economic power as a matter for voters to address, is inherently leftist, and in which the far left can refer to those who strongly endorse democracy, the US Constitution. This usage appears now quite common in the USA and, as one might suppose, has created some confusion and conflict, including among conservatives, Republicans, about the proposed status of democracy and the US Constitution. 

An entirely different take on what puts the “far” into far right and far left is that it is meant simply to indicate relative position from some central position, so as the overall political climate shifts right, “far left” refers to what was formerly the moderate left. In this instance, it’s not the ability of democracy to sustain consideration of the ethics of economic power that makes it inherently leftist to some right wingers, it’s simply that a great many people in the USA no longer support democracy, so supporting it becomes “far left.”

What’s the point? Talk about left and right, far left and far right, all you want, just be aware different people may have in mind different things by those terms, and one may easily end up talking past others due to equivocation on terms, resulting in confusion and conflict. As always in such cases, it’s typically easier, less confusing to just spell things out. Are you talking about the ethics of economic power? Who should decide that? Democracy versus authoritarian government? Welfare state or a state indifferent to citizens’ welfare? Takes a bit longer, of course, but at least people know what you’re talking about. Of course, if you’re not interested in talking sincerely, if you’re more interested in misleading, manipulative rhetoric, word games, then knock yourself out, unless your audience demands better. 

Addendum: Forgot the peculiar modern take in which all government, law, is cast as “left,” and “right" either doesn’t exist or becomes lawless, violent anarchism, conventionally neither right nor left. Comical, but likely also causes some terminological confusion and conflict.

Economics And Ethical Controversy

I was thinking the other day of the damage done to the USA not just by bad economics in the conservative style but also by the neoclassical welfare economics on which it is loosely based. Maybe this week I can wax philosophical, just a bit?

The most controversial ethics, those most likely to lead to disagreement, conflict, are likely those addressing how to resolve interpersonal conflicts of preferences, such as over scarce resources, including via law, the very ethics exogenous to neoclassical welfare economics. One might have an ethical opinion about other people’s behavior in isolation, of course, but seems relatively difficult to contrive ethically controversial cases. Apple or orange? Who cares? Person doesn’t know apple poisoned? Well, maybe. Or is it his or her business to know? But two people fighting over some scarce resource, let’s say a vaccine? That’s rather more likely to result in ethical controversy, conflict, disagreement, isn’t it? Should person A or person B have it? Why? What’s so special about A’s claim relative to B’s or vice versa? Let’s say A is sick but poor, and if we use a non-market allocation system based on medical need, A gets the vaccine. B is not sick but economically powerful, and if we enforce a market solution based on economic power (and desire), B gets the vaccine. Controversial? Maybe. Does it matter if we’re not talking about a vaccine or anything else necessary for life like food, water, shelter, whatever? How about who gets the big shelter, the one with room for a pony? Anything change? Just saying. There are some potential issues.

Neoclassical welfare economics famously punts on such issues by focusing on individual preference rankings, confusingly labeled as “utility,” which cannot be used to address or resolve interpersonal conflicts of preferences. That’s what makes the theory an ethical half-theory. The ostensible rationale is to investigate what one can say without taking up controversial ethical issues, and the answer, of course, is very little indeed, because in reality we’re always faced with resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences, allocating resources. People can get a little confused on that point because in the Fairy Land of Economic Theory, in which such issues and such ethics are banned, neoclassical welfare economics becomes a full ethical theory, capable of sustaining certain conclusions about optimal arrangements, etc. It’s why it’s always so important when dealing with someone working with neoclassical welfare economics to determine when they’re talking about the Fairy Land of Economic Theory, where certain results and conclusions apply, and when reality, where they may not apply. Bad economics in the conservative style, as I define it, plays games in that area, tries to muddy the water, conflates the Fairy Land with reality, incorrectly applies conclusions and results to reality that fail to account for the exogenous ethics that pertain to reality.

What happens when an entire society’s thinking on economic issues, the allocation of scare resources, is based on neoclassical welfare economics and the Fairy Land of Economic Theory? Important, vital, albeit controversial ethical issues go unaddressed, undiscussed. Until one fine day someone suggests changing the definition, distribution, use of economic power (extent of the market) and hence changing the resolution of interpersonal conflicts of preferences, the allocation of resources. Then the suppressed conflict comes flooding back. Or again, what happens when an entire society’s thinking on economic issues, the allocation of scare resources, is based on bad economics in the conservative style? Important, controversial ethical issues are slipped in, undiscussed, in a confusing, opaque, misleading, way. To reduce conflict and confusion relating to the ethics of economic power, the allocation of scarce resources, we must stop trying to avoid them, sweep them under the rug. Seek to understand real neoclassical welfare economics, especially its theoretical limitations. Understand and reject bad economics in the conservative style, which tries to slyly slip in exogenous normative or ethical content through the back door. Demand honest, sincere discussion of the necessary normative or ethical inputs. Don’t settle for misleading, opaque rhetoric.

One can’t understand the role of democratic government in market-based economic systems without understanding it as a mechanism for addressing and temporarily, contingently, resolving via law, regulation, policy, potential controversial ethical issues relating to economic power. One can’t understand the ethos of democracy without considering the fundamental basis of ethics, private versus social ethics, the role of voters, and the importance of debatable, changeable social ethics respecting the majority will for creating a stable, peaceful society. To stem the rise of anti-democracy, fascist sentiment in the USA, we must address the sickly and unhelpful legacy of bad economics in the conservative style; we must explain neoclassical welfare economics correctly, including its limitations, its ethical half-theory structure. To stem the tide of violent political extremism, we must learn to discuss the ethics of the definition of economic power (property), distribution of economic power, use of economic power (extent of the market) sensibly, calmly, rationally, agree a mechanism to debate, address.

Two Levels of Bad Economics

I overheard someone talking about something called “free market economics” and it made me think of the two levels at which that phrase may relate to anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style, so I thought I might discuss that this week. I may have suggested before I have a particular interest in what I call “level problems,” where the same idea, concern, issue can arise in two or more places or levels of some broader theory. Seems always to create great potential for confusion and conflict.

One level at which the phrase “free market economics” may relate to bad economics in the conservative style is that a “free market" is not a thing in neoclassical welfare economics, it’s undefined in that theory, so if one implies otherwise, well, that’s bad economics. What is a “free market,” I wonder. A “perfectly competitive” market with the particular unreal conditions specified in neoclassical welfare economics? Any old market structure? A market with so-called “market failures?” A monopoly? Oligopoly? Who knows? Who cares? Bad economics.

I suppose I should say, as “free” may seem to convey normative or ethical content, it’s not my intention right now to object to any ethical theory that claims some particular instance of a market laudable because “free” under some definition. Only, it’s not economics. And as always with what I call bad economics, “bad” is not meant to imply normative content I might not evaluate particularly highly myself, but a lack of clarity, sincerity, a failure to lay out one’s normative or ethical case for evaluation and debate in an honest way. So a “free market economics” that doesn't pretend to be neoclassical welfare economics, that includes an ethical theory defining the sense of “free” being invoked, helps readers evaluate it normatively, relates it to some or all real market structures, is not “bad,” per se. In my experience, that sort of honest explication of some sort of unusual economics / ethics blend called “free market economics” is rare. What seems much more common are underhanded attempts to imply such a theory can be derived from neoclassical welfare economics.

However, there is another level at which bad economics in the conservative style meets “free market economics,” and that is at a rather more advanced level, when one mentally replaces “free” with “perfectly competitive” and confines oneself to neoclassical welfare economics. Bad economics in the conservative style at that second level involves a misunderstanding of the normative limitations of neoclassical welfare economics, the ethical half-theory structure, and the relation of reality to the Fairy Land of Economic Theory. This is the level of bad economics in the conservative style one tends to hear from those with a modicum of training in economics, and sometimes from those with quite a lot of training.

Conflation between the two levels creates a great deal of confusion and conflict. Those with some knowledge of economics may assume bad economics in the conservative style refers only to lower level issues associated with simplistic “free market economics” and be dismissive or take umbrage at the notion they’re engaging in such nonsense themselves. Indeed, their tendency will be to confront bad economics by trying to explain issues endogenous to neoclassical welfare economics, confining themselves to explaining what the theory says. But that only works for the lower level sort of bad economics, not the higher sort. Addressing higher level bad economics in the conservative style involves a broader context, an assessment of the normative argument in neoclassical welfare economics and how it relates to reality, the limitations of “utility,” the role of exogenous ethics, etc.

“Free market economics” can be bad economics in the conservative style in two entirely different ways, corresponding to the two levels at which bad economics in the conservative style can go off the rails. Don't get them twisted. They can both cause confusion and conflict.

In Defense of Stupid People

Someone was talking the other day about the economic situation of stupid people and how it might affect their politics, and I thought it an interesting issue in the ethics of the distribution of economic power. This week: a defense of stupid people.

Do you detect a certain churlishness in my choice of words? Yes, I’m afraid I’m trying to be a bit confrontational or blunt right now to encourage people to think about what may be an awkward issue in the generally awkward area of the ethics of the distribution of economic power. Before anyone gets too worked up, let me say I don’t mean “stupid” as a random schoolyard epithet. I mean relatively unintelligent. I suppose real people will fall in a range or distribution of intelligence, unlike the artificial ciphers of the world of economic theory. Nor am I talking this week about ignorance, a function of education, which is a different issue. Perhaps I’m behind the times, but I suppose some people may have a rather easier time with education than others for a variety of reasons including, I propose, innate intelligence. As always, I’m rather more interested in normative than positive issues, so if one finds the idea of a distribution of intelligence bunk, perhaps one can think in hypotheticals yet derive something of value from the discussion. Even if one doesn’t believe in the existence of stupidity, as opposed to ignorance, the general issue may be of interest as long as one accepts some factor affecting the distribution of economic power in markets may not be under the individual's control. 

Aside from common results-oriented ethics related to real utilitarianism, distinct from the misleading faux “utilitarianism” of the ethical half-theory of neoclassical welfare economics, which doesn’t take up distributional ethics, one very common ethical view involves “merit.” According to that view, equity, fairness, justice in the realm of distributional ethics should take precedence over considerations of welfare or real utility, so an ethical system for distributing economic power will distribute it by individual “merit," not evaluating welfare. (I’m setting aside the apparent complication introduced by common yet seemingly contradictory support for inheritance, which doesn’t involve individual merit, albeit perhaps some sort of familial or ancestral merit. Yes, popular ethics is a rich tapestry.) Of course, talking about “merit” doesn’t get one very far unless one specifies what one has in mind, and one significant issue in that context is whether it can be something one is simply born with or must be derived from personal effort or volition of some sort. This vital issue is typically submerged or glossed over in the context of ethical or normative discussions centering on wages and labor markets using vague references to work, effort, “productivity,” and so on. 

Let’s take the bull by the horns and imagine a stupid person who works very hard, makes great effort, puts in long hours, does everything he or she can possibly do in a real labor market, yet for the most part tanks, ends up with minimum wage, no benefits, part time, etc. Won’t necessarily happen, of course. Plenty involved in real labor market results beyond intelligence, but holding everything else equal, and assuming it exists, I suppose one may accept stupidity less advantageous than cleverness in a competitive labor market. Does this represent an ethical issue we should address or not? Does the proposed innate characteristic of stupidity cancel out everything else potentially related to “merit" under this person's individual control? Is it ethical he or she has little, if any, economic power? Why am I asking such awkward questions? Because I perceive under the influence of bad economics in the conservative style, many appear to view competitive labor markets as a utopian machine or black box providing all with what they should rightly have. But is it what people honestly suppose? Is the labor market doing what they find ethically correct, or are they concluding ethically correct whatever it happens to do? I’d just like confidence people are thinking about the real issues involved, making conscious choices, voting.

Oh, you wanted my personal views? Well, I suppose society should subsidize stupid people. I don’t much care for a world of clever people, often sorely lacking in every other form of merit or laudable characteristic, forever trying to take advantage of stupid people. Sure, smart people are important and should have their due, but ethically their due may not be whatever they can squeeze out of stupid people. Indeed, if I were choosing between stupid with a good heart, and clever with a bad, I’d take stupid every time. And when one considers the relationship of stupid people to crime and all manner of anti-democracy claptrap including fascism and anarchism, due to their inability to think systemically, anticipate consequences, their gullibility, one may see practical reasons to support them.

The stupid, the relatively unintelligent, the slow on the uptake, will always be with us, but we don’t have to let clever people take advantage of them, screw them over at every opportunity, in both word and deed. That’s a social choice we can make or not. Case in point: purposefully opaque neoclassical welfare economics and anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style built upon it. Again, the clever trying to con the stupid, laughing all the way to the bank. Let’s stop. Speak carefully, honestly about economics too. The stupid can be and often are good people, with plenty to offer, and can show it given the right context to thrive. So why not create conditions to make it happen? Maybe think of society more as a diverse family cooperating and thriving together than a nest of egoistic vipers?

Liberalism, Again

Some fellow was wondering the meaning of “liberalism,” which he explained he formerly associated with “woke-ness” and “The Left” but had started to think through again. In the interests of everyone trying to get along, I thought I might take another whack.

Traditional American (“leftist") “liberalism” is about giving people space to live, be free, exercise their liberty, until their preferences conflict at a certain level of significance with those of other people, in which case law, government, democracy must get involved. Liberalism’s distinctive take on gender issues, sexual orientation, freedom of and from religion, embrace of diversity, abhorrence of forced and unnecessary social conformity, is based on the perception those interpersonal conflicts of preferences do not rise to that level. It’s not based on the belief everyone shares the beliefs, values, ethics, tastes, culture, preferences, behavior, etc., involved, merely that someone being offended by someone else’s ideas or actions in those areas is insufficient justification to use law to suppress them.

Where traditional American liberalism tends to part ways with authoritarian or fascistic forms of conservatism is that the latter tends to have various non-democratic elements typically relating to ostensibly “natural” rights and laws, religious precepts, etc. A typical example of where the difference becomes apparent involves economic power. For liberals, government must be, and indeed always is, involved in establishing the legal definition, distribution, use of economic power. Liberals propose laws in that area are necessary for any society, and interpersonal conflicts of preferences in that area are very significant because they involve the allocation of scare resources, welfare, fairness, justice, etc. Because they see law as necessary, they propose that law be based in the always changing, always evolving ethical beliefs of the governed, the voters, and established using democratic government.

Conservatives are no less interested in the realms of personal freedom, liberty, law but because their ethics are so different, they start from entirely different places and, of course, end up in entirely different places. For authoritarian or fascistic conservatives, there is one correct set of ethical beliefs relating to economic power, those ethics must be expressed in law, and voters, democracy, must be prevented from changing those laws, regardless of the level of interpersonal conflict. Similarly, they may propose law is necessary to enforce social uniformity on, say, religion, because in their ethical world there is again, one correct religion, and voters, democracy should have no role to play in that important area of law.

So the difference between traditional American (leftist) liberalism and conservatism / “classical liberalism,” is not about seeing a role for both law and personal choice, but how to strike the balance, the ethical rationale involved. One big difference is that liberalism sees interpersonal conflicts of preferences even about the role of the state and individual as a significant ethical issue that must be resolved by the governed, democratically, while conservatives of the authoritarian or fascistic sort also suppose it significant but propose for that reason it must not be subject to the views of the voters, the will of the governed, democracy. This is why any discussion of the difference between liberals and conservatives that does not feature prominently the proposed role of democratic government, the governed and their ethical beliefs, is liable to be misleading, rhetorical, unhelpful.

Once that issue is addressed, one may move on to a second level discussion, internal to democracy, about one’s personal views about the ethics of economic power, markets, resource use, etc., which one may express to other voters in a democratic context. There is also a form of “conservatism” operating at this level, democratic conservatism as opposed to authoritarian / fascist conservatism, that makes an ethical case for certain arrangements including about economic power, but leaves it to voters, democracy, to decide socially. “Liberalism” is sometimes also associated with the expression of particular personal views on the ethics of economic power and other matters, which is what gives it its perceived “leftist” or “progressive” quality, but support for democracy is implicit. Liberals and democratic conservatives can happily co-exist in a democratic society. It’s not at all clear liberals and democratic conservatives can happily co-exist with anti-democracy authoritarian or fascistic conservatives.

Economics As A Purportedly Neutral Discipline

I was part of a fun little exchange the other day about whether “economics” is a “neutral” discipline, as opposed to “political economy,” which was presented as not. Maybe I'll take a look at that this week.

Defining “economics” is famously tricky because the discipline involves disparate components. Some components, such as mathematical or engineering optimization techniques, may fairly be considered neutral tools applicable to a variety of different problems. Other components, such as the scientific or empirically predictive component, are often meant to be neutral, cast as neutral, but there is quite often some question about the role of neutral scientific evaluation based on empirical success versus other potential criteria. These other criteria, theoretical tractability, “understanding,” etc., can introduce non-neutral, normative evaluative elements to even ostensibly positive economics. For example, “understanding” often seems to equate roughly to intuitively appealing storytelling.

When one considers explicitly normative economics, such as neoclassical welfare economics, a traditional component of “economics,” the idea of “neutrality” becomes even more confusing and questionable. As with any ethical theory, the logic of the argument presented may be considered “neutral,” but the theory itself would not normally be considered “neutral.” It’s of interest to those who accept certain normative propositions and reject others; it expresses an ethical viewpoint. This is what I often refer to as “positive normative” economics, the conceit that economists aren’t presenting neoclassical welfare economics as a normative theory anyone should care about, they’re just analyzing the logic of the argument, in case anyone is interested. They then turn out around and give their policy evaluations, recommendations, based on that normative theory, but still, ostensibly just in case anyone is interested, which they’re not claiming anyone should be. Why do they talk in that funny, insincere way? Because while they appear to like and agree with the resulting policy recommendations, they don’t want to or can’t do proper ethical philosophy, evaluate their normative theory, or even analyze it or describe it well enough for others to do so. In their view, it’s not their job.

Neoclassical welfare economics is not “neutral” as far as normative content, it expresses a certain normative viewpoint and is of interest to those who agree that viewpoint. So is neoclassical welfare economics not really “economics” but “political economy?” Ironically, the ethical issues associated with political decisions about the definition, distribution, use of economic power are purposefully, explicitly excluded from neoclassical welfare economics, which is what makes it an ethical half-theory in relation to reality. Indeed, that’s typically the context for people who advocate the study of “political economy,” a desire to include those otherwise excluded issues, albeit usually introduced in the context of improving positive rather than normative economics. Of course, those are the issues lurking in the background of anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style, where people try to apply neoclassical welfare economics in realistic setting without taking proper note of the exogenous positive and normative issues. Thus, anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style may well be considered a sort of political economy, if an opaque, misleading sort, which some propose may be countered by a more real, conscientious, explicit sort of political economy. But as I often point out, anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style, although perhaps a sort of opaque, bad “political economy,” is not really part of “economics” as much as a clumsy misinterpretation of one part of it, used for purposes of political rhetoric. 

So, is “economics,” as distinct from “political economy,” a “neutral” discipline? Seems rather misleading to say so, in part because neoclassical welfare economics is conventionally part of “economics,” while anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style isn’t really.

Ethics For The Fairy Land

An interesting distinction between ethics for the Fairy Land of Economic Theory and conventional ethics for reality is that in the former some of the ethical content is expressed not in normative propositions but in the characteristics of the Fairy Land. I thought of the topic the other day when wondering, as I sometimes do, whether the core ethical proposition of neoclassical welfare economics is that we, the observers, should “maximize” total social “utility” under real conditions, or only under certain unreal conditions. 

Recall that “utility” in modern neoclassical welfare economics is all about the expression of preferences, whether defined as preference rank “utility” or inaccessible inner perceptions of satisfaction from preference fulfillment “utility.” If someone with mental illness prefers to throw himself off the astronomy tower under the mistaken belief he will fly, are we meant to agree to let him because it “maximizes” total social “utility,” or not really? If someone prefers to eat an apple we know has been poisoned but she does not, are we meant to agree to let her eat it because it “maximizes” total social “utility,” or not really? If someone has become addicted to some drug and prefers another fix, which we know will likely kill him, are we meant to agree to let him because it “maximizes” total social “utility,” or not really?

One might suppose it would be easy enough to figure out what normative neoclassical welfare economics says. I mean, how else can we evaluate the proposition we should maximize social “utility?” But surprisingly, no, not really. In neoclassical welfare economics, there’s no formal ethical proposition saying we should only “maximize” total social “utility” under a set of arbitrary conditions like people are perfectly rational, fully informed, not manipulated, not addicted, not desperate, etc. However, one might suspect those conditions are built into the structure of the Fairy Land. Can the ciphers, the subjects of Fairy Land, be ignorant, irrational, deluded, manipulated, addicted, desperate, etc.? I’m not entirely sure. Certainly as a condition of “perfectly competitive markets,” we know all about the assumptions of “perfect information” and “perfect rationality.” But what about at the level of just evaluating the normative goal of “maximizing” total social “utility?” 

If economists working with normative neoclassical welfare economics were careful ethical philosophers, they would be very clear and rigorous about the conditions under which we’re meant to evaluate the ethical proposition we should “maximize” total social “utility.” But they’re not, and they don’t want to be. They want to be scientists and mathematicians. They don’t care about themselves or anyone else evaluating normative propositions. And that’s really the whole problem with what I sometimes facetiously call positive normative economics. One can’t do proper ethics without clearly specifying the factual premises involved in one’s argument. Real ethics are understood to apply to reality, even if not all characteristics of reality are formally introduced as factual premises. One may fairly bring up considerations that apply in reality. Ethics for an unreal, artificial Fairy Land are different.

Economists want to play with arbitrary mathematical models of their own design, which purveyors of bad economics then use slyly, opaquely, inappropriately, to make dodgy ethical or normative statements about the real world, and many economists simply don’t care. There’s no one really watching what they’re doing, keeping tabs on them, keeping them honest, speaking up for real neoclassical welfare economics. Well, maybe not no one, exactly. A few. But there should be more. If you’re committed to doing normative economics, playing ethical arbiter for society, get serious about philosophy, ethics. If you want to be a scientist, engineer, mathematician, drop the normative content, the ethics, and learn to talk right.

A Nice Example Of Bad Economics In The Conservative Style

I saw a nice expression of bad economics in the conservative style the other day, “Economists shouldn’t pick winners and losers, they should just give policy advice based on efficiency.” You see it, right? No? Even now? Fine, let’s talk through it.

First, we have the typical ambiguity about “efficiency.” Are we talking about “economic efficiency” defined with respect to “utility” specifically? Or general technical efficiency defined with respect to some unspecified socially agreed goal X? To the extent we’re talking about efficiency with respect to attaining socially agreed upon goal X, that seems a technical matter that wouldn’t involve economists addressing ethical issues relating to X, such as resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences, economic power, etc. Granted, there may be ethical issues, tradeoffs, considerations involved in choosing, pursuing goal X, but in this case the goal is not being generated by economists themselves, so they’re not choosing the winners and losers associated with goal X. The situation is completely different, of course, if we’re talking about so-called “economic efficiency” defined specifically with respect to “utility,” which is a goal economists themselves provide, based on explicitly normative neoclassical welfare economics. 

To the extent we’re talking about “economic efficiency” defined with respect to “utility,” a famous feature of the sort of “utility” defined in neoclassical welfare economics is that it does not support interpersonal comparisons of “utility.” Therefore, comparing two situations that differ in the sense of requiring the resolution of some interpersonal tradeoff is not something one can do within the framework of neoclassical welfare economics, even if one situation is “economically efficient” and one not. Suggesting economists break distributional indifference by arguing for any instance of an “economically efficient” outcome in that case, ignoring interpersonal tradeoffs, is not proper neoclassical welfare economics, it’s bad economics in the conservative style. Basically, one would be implicitly taking sides on the ethics of resolving the interpersonal conflict, thus rendering the original advice oxymoronic. One cannot, in realistic contexts, pursue only “economic efficiency” without at the same time choosing winners and losers. It’s something that really only makes sense in the arbitrarily, restricted world of theoretical economics, what I call The Fairy Land Of Economic Theory, in which any “economically efficient” outcome is literally equivalent to any other because some relevant ethics are exogenous. If one were in the attenuated, artificial Fairy Land of Economic Theory in which certain ethical issues are set aside, or maybe a hypothetical world in which everyone agrees those ethics, restricting oneself to “economic efficiency” would be uncontroversial, but not in reality.

What are the options for following real neoclassical welfare economics in realistic contexts? 1) Express indifference, pass the ethical issues to others. 2) Explain the theory expresses indifference but adduce explicit ethical arguments of one’s own to give policy advice. And, of course, 3) explain what “economic efficiency” really means, why it’s an attractive goal, if there are no other ethical issues to consider relating to resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences, and really even individual preference rankings (ignorance, etc.). One can express any ethical ideas relating to the resolution of interpersonal conflicts of preferences one likes without pretending one is talking about neoclassical welfare economics, without resorting to bad economics in the conservative style. Just be honest about it. The problem with bad economics in the conservative style is not that it promotes conservative ideas relating to the ethics of the definition, distribution, use of economic power, but that it does so in an underhanded way. It’s bad economics and creates confusion and conflict.

The Tale Of The Three Sailors And The Efficient Allocation

I was talking about “efficiency” the other day and it reminded me of a funny tale I heard in an old seafarer’s tavern one day about three sailors marooned on a desert island inhabited by the spirit of a powerful economist. Want to hear it? Fine. I’ll tell it.

Seems three old tars washed ashore one day on a desert isle. While waiting for their ship to come in they split up to look for food. All they could find was three caches of coconuts. One had one hundred coconuts in it and the other two had one each. They were about to consolidate and dole out their coconut booty when one of them, Sharky the Pirate, a cold and egoistic fellow, who had found the cache with one hundred coconuts, objected and declared he should keep his cache and the other two theirs. Sharky, who had attended a few economic lectures as a callow youth, informed them. “Our current allocation is efficient, and in times like these, we should concentrate on what’s efficient, not stray from that path.” “Efficient for what?” the other two asked incredulously. 

“Efficient for total health and wellbeing? Because under our current allocation we two will likely starve before the ship comes in.” “No, not efficient for that,” said Sharky. 

“Efficient for the total production of coconuts? Because if we two get more, we’ll have the strength to search again and likely find more than you could ever find on your own.” “No, not efficient for that,” said Sharky.

“Efficient for general human welfare or satisfaction? Because we two will surely value our second coconut more than you value whatever is left after the ship arrives.” “No, not efficient for that,” said Sharky.

“Efficient for the production and promotion of an ethical society, peace, goodwill between us? Because we have ethical beliefs we think should really be considered.” “No, not efficient for that,” said Sharky.

“Efficient for what, then?” they exclaimed. Eager now to show his erudition, Sharky explained, “It’s just Economics 101, my lads. Efficient for maximizing ‘utility’ as defined by economists. Economic efficiency.” “Say what?” his companions asked, slack-jawed.

Sharky couldn’t say exactly, but he had heard tales the spirit of a powerful economist haunted the isle, so he summoned the spirit with arcane chanting, strange runes, and offerings of coin. Suddenly, in a thick haze of black smoke, The Economist appeared! “Yes, my children,” the spirit proclaimed. “Sharky is correct. The distribution of coconuts is economically efficient. That’s because economic efficiency is defined with respect to a very special sort of ‘utility’ only we economists use. Economic efficiency defined with respect to ‘utility’ means simply I cannot move anyone up his or her preference rankings, or increase his or her ‘utility’ as we say, without moving someone else down his or her preference rankings, decreasing his or her ‘utility.’”

“So ethics are not relevant at all?” the other two asked, still mystified.

“Whose ethics?” the spirit replied slyly. “My ethics? As an economist, even in spirit form, my own ethical reasoning is confined to the ‘utility’ on which neoclassical welfare economics is based. Sharky’s ethics? Well, if Sharky had preferences based in ethics consistent with your own, consideration of ‘utility’ may have worked out to your favor. However, I can assure you he does not, so interpersonal conflict is inevitable.”

The two were about to despair when one remembered something he once read on an old message board about economics being an ethical half-theory. “And what about us? Our ethics? Are you saying we should accept what’s economically efficient, no other ethical considerations matter?” 

The spirit glowered. “You have spoken the magic words! No, economic efficiency is not ethically dispositive. Indeed, it addresses only the most insignificant of ethical issues, here blocking the preferences of Sharky with no benefit to you. Pursuing economic efficiency is rarely a controversial ethical goal unless one sees ethical issues with another’s preferences, but it’s quite rare to find a situation where that’s the only issue, where resolving an interpersonal conflict of preferences is not also involved. No, the resolution of the significant, controversial ethical issues associated with how interpersonal conflicts of preferences over scarce resources are resolved, such as your current dispute over the disposition of the life-giving fruit, is up to you to decide.” With that, the spirit vanished, leaving only the acrid smell of sulfur in the air. 

One of the coconut challenged old tars said, “Seems we’ll need to find a way to address our ethical differences on our own. I suggest parley, followed by democratic vote.”

Sharky fumed. “I suggest you two mind your own damn business, and if ever you get any of my coconuts, it will be from my cold, dead fingers. I see your sham ethics, all about greed, self interest, survival, but I have an ethical right to dispose of my coconuts as I will. If you two had a hundred coconuts each, and I one, you would surely tyrannically seize my one to split between you, and I would starve. Your ethics are false, what’s real is a perpetual war of all against all for resources or anyway ethics based in rights not granted by you.”

A violent melee then ensued in which Sharky tried every underhanded fighting trick in the book to prevail over his companions, but driven by ethical indignation, the will to thrive, and finally abject hatred, two succeeded where one failed. After due deliberation and reasoned debate, they voted and adopted the distribution of coconuts the majority found ethical, they all shared the coconuts and lived to sail another day, friends thereafter, but it was a near run thing. Or that’s the version I heard, anyway.

Liberalism And Libertarianism

I saw a nice quote from some “libertarian” outfit describing their core belief that I think points to the essential difference between pro-democracy liberalism and one version of anti-democracy “libertarianism.” Let’s discuss that this week. 

Recall the traditional American liberal ethos is that everyone should be able to do as they please unless what they want to do harms another or conflicts with what another wants to do. In these interpersonal conflict of preference situations, we need laws to resolve conflict. The liberal ethos proposes the best way to make such laws is democratic government because the ethics involved are ultimately subjective and everyone’s views in a given society are important to consider and, of course, the views of the people may change over time, evolve. The tricky bit from the perspective of liberalism is determining when the interpersonal conflict of preferences rises to the level at which law becomes necessary and when it’s more simply a matter of someone’s possibly overly delicate sensibilities being offended or what have you.

The “libertarian” version, cited in the aforementioned passage, was that everyone should be able to express their “rights,” unless they conflict with the “rights” of others. The proposed resolution of any conflicts of “rights” was conspicuously absent. Also conspicuously absent was any mention of whether the relevant “rights” were meant to be legal artifacts and, if so, what manner of government determined or defined them, or simply ethical “rights” each person decided in his or her own mind based on ethics, religion, etc. In rhetorically slick but philosophically sloppy “libertarianism,” the two meanings of “rights” seem often run together resulting in the idea the only legitimate government is an authoritarian government reflecting one’s own personal view of ethics in every particular. I say that’s one version of “libertarianism” because it suggests a resolution of at least some interpersonal conflicts on the basis of “rights.” There’s another version that follows bad economics in the conservative style to simply ignore or dismiss interpersonal conflict. That other version of “libertarianism” uses selective perceptive to support existing power relationships, particularly economic power relationships, and to suggest certain resolutions of interpersonal conflicts are more consistent with “liberty” or “freedom” than others. But let’s return to the more explicitly “rights” based version today and the contention the only legitimate government is an authoritarian government reflecting one’s own personal view of ethics in every particular.

To be clear, a right wing, non-democratic, authoritarian government that reflects conservative ethical views in every particular, particularly relating to the definition, distribution, use of economic power, defends those views against democracy, is basically fascism. However, by adding one’s own content in a sympathetic way, one can make “libertarianism” say whatever one likes. The devil is in the details. What “rights” are we talking about? Where are they coming from? Who specifies them? Who enforces them? How are conflicts resolved? One can construct a version consistent with liberalism, in which the “rights” are legal rights meant to resolve certain interpersonal conflicts and defined by democratic government according to the ethical views of the voters, with conflicts between rights resolved similarly. Similarly, one can construct a version consistent with anarchism, in which the “rights” involved are ethical “rights” determined by each individual, everyone can make up their own list, no one need follow any law, and violent conflict is used to resolve any conflict.

“Libertarianism” is not a serious, coherent political philosophy. It’s a studiously confusing, misleading bit of right wing political rhetoric. However, in practice, most “libertarians” tend to see themselves as above the laws of democracy. “Libertarianism” is typically an appeal to the ego. The typically incredulous indictment of democracy from a “libertarian” is, “Are you willing to allow other people, democracy, ‘mob rule,’ make a law that conflicts what you believe is your right, as a matter of ethics?” The answer, of course, is usually yes, but not always. Living in a society requires such compromise. But one may hold some subjective ethical principles too important to justify remaining part of a society, one may feel the need to become an outlaw, a criminal, a revolutionary. In the old USA, some living in slave states did that over the issue of slavery, and I applaud them. I suppose if slavery were reinstated today through democratic vote and “orginalist” constitutional interpretation, I might become an outlaw, a criminal, to follow my own ethics. But if one is embedded in any society it’s fair for that society to expect one to follow the law, and if one doesn’t, one should be prepared to accept the consequences. Outlaws, criminals, are a dime a dozen, and for so many reasons. It’s not unusual. If that’s all “libertarians” are saying, that if democracy delivers an unwelcome verdict, let’s say, on the definition, distribution, use of economic power, they reserve the right to become criminals, outlaws, in pursuit of their own ethics relating to those issues, that’s fine. They can join the ranks of criminals, outlaws, if they’re willing to pay the consequences, of course. But, no, I don’t think I can really support a fascist government with them at the helm to ensure they’ll never have to face that awkward decision, while others do.

If you feel people should be able to do as they please unless their preferences harm others or conflict with others’ preferences to some level of significance, in which case democracy should create laws to resolve those conflicts, you support liberalism, not “libertarianism.” Just thought you’d like to know.  

Purveyors of Bad Economics As The Last Logical Positivists

Last week, I did a post on the positive versus normative distinction in neoclassical welfare economics, and I mentioned the old 1950s philosophical doctrine of “logical positivism.” I suspect it may be the basis of a rare four tier level issue. Let’s discuss.

Recall a “level issue” for me is where the same or similar issue or issues can arise at different points or levels of a discussion, which can then be conflated or confused with one another to comical effect. An example in neoclassical economics involves subjects tautologically maximizing their “utility” by making choices, while economists advocate for choosing to maximize total social “utility.”  Talking about maximizing “utility?” Mind the level to avoid confusion. I’m sure there must be some formal term for what I’m calling a level issue, probably in Latin. Unfortunately I don’t know the proper name, and I can’t be bothered to investigate it just now, so let’s just call it a level issue, shall we?

As I’ve discussed before, neoclassical economics may appear purpose built to generate level issues because of the ease with which one can shift between or combine different perspectives, actors and roles: economist, non-economist observer, theoretical cipher, real subject. For example, I’ve discussed a level issue involving the fact that, because of the restrictive nature of the “utility” used in neoclassical welfare economics, economists qua economists are not meant to express ethics relating to resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences. In a market system, the resolution of interpersonal conflicts of preferences takes place on the basis of economic power, so economists qua economists are not meant to have ethics relating to the definition, distribution, use of economic power. The ostensible rationale for setting those issues aside, rendering neoclassical welfare economics an ethical half-theory, is the desire to avoid the controversial ethical issues associated with resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences.

That issue is logically distinct from whether the theoretical ciphers being studied have preference rankings, and hence “utility,” involving such ethics and living in what they consider an ethical society. Nothing in the definition of “utility” prevents it. They apparently do not, because if they did, interpersonal conflicts of preferences that cannot be resolved on the basis of “utility” would be potentially ubiquitous and would conflict with any normative conclusions economists may wish to make regarding the ciphers. Note this rationale is different from the first rationale, which applied to economists qua economists, to neoclassical welfare economics as a theory. This rationale pertains to subjects in the form of defined, artificial ciphers, and the desire to make theoretical conclusions. 

This is one of the issues that arises when one takes “utility” from out the Fairy Land of Economic Theory and its particular unreal restrictions, and tries to plonk it down in reality, where, of course, real subjects have preferences relating to ethics, are not ciphers. That’s what creates issues in the context of the liberal ethos, which suggests laws are typically required to resolve interpersonal conflicts of ethics, while bad economics in the conservative style wrongly interprets neoclassical welfare economics as saying there aren’t any. If you’re keeping track, the issue of theoretical ciphers not having preference rankings relating to the ethics of resolving interpersonal conflict is often discussed under the rubric of “methodological individualism,” where it’s commonly conflated with positive issues. Actually, I suppose that may be a good example of a straightforward issue in the ethical argument presented in normative economics, neoclassical welfare economics, being confusingly associated with issues relating to scientific method in positive economics.

Now by theoretical subjects, ciphers, I meant subjects in roles other than businesspeople qua businesspeople, because they’re famously meant to maximize profit, money, not “utility.” They’re not meant to consider ethics, or preferences about ethics, for yet another reason. The relation of theoretical ciphers in the form of businesspeople qua businesspeople to their real world counterparts may, of course, be different from the relation of other theoretical subjects to their real world counterparts. Real world business may require certain things.

Anyway, that issue, in turn, is logically distinct from whether non-economist observers, distinct in the world of theory from economists qua economists and theoretical ciphers as subjects, may have ethical beliefs relating to resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences. In realistic contexts, as opposed to theoretic contexts, that is to say, in reality as opposed to the Fairy Land, the distinction between “non-economist observer” and subjects, now real people rather than arbitrarily defined theoretical ciphers, breaks down. The conventional take is, yes, of course, non-economist observers are meant to have views on the ethics of resolving interpersonal conflicts and hence about the definition, distribution, use of economic power. Someone must or we simply have a world with no ethics. 

However, the suggestion some early twentieth century economist may have been motivated by “logical positivism” in their quest to view normative economics as positive, to make economics a “pure” science, throws that into question and takes us to yet a fourth level of considerations. The logical positivists were fascinated by science to such an extent they famously declared anything not verifiable according to empirical experience, data, such as ethical beliefs, for example, to be literal nonsense. This suggests some may suppose the reason economists are meant to not take up certain ethical issues is not to avoid potential controversy but because ethics is, in fact, nonsense. The same rationale may apply to all actors in all roles, theoretic ciphers and real people. It’s an ultimately nihilistic view, because of course if ethics is nonsense, then the ethics endogenous to neoclassical welfare economics involving “utility” is also nonsense, any argument for certain economic arrangements, market structures, is nonsense. I usually ignore the possibility anyone seriously considers ethics nonsense. Logical positivism exited the building long ago. But might some philosophically clueless purveyors of bad economics still be pursuing the amoral dreams of the old logical positivists? Interesting idea. Do you know enough about neoclassical welfare economics to understand it ignores certain ethical issues relating to resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences? Fine. That’s one level thinking. Which actor, in what role, why, and how is it meant to relate to reality? Confronting anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style means understanding the normative or ethical argument being made in neoclassical welfare economics and how it relates to reality. Lots of funny business in that area. Have a care.

Positive and Normative in Economics

I had an interesting conversation the other day about the usefulness of the philosophical distinction between normative and positive in the context of neoclassical welfare economics and bad economics in the conservative style. Let’s discuss that this week.

To understand the issue, it helps to know some history. What eventually became neoclassical economics has intellectual roots going back to 18th century moral philosophy, and it retains notable normative, ethical content to this day in the form of neoclassical “welfare” economics. However, by the early 20th century, with all hands on deck fighting the perceived threat from “leftist” economic ideas, orthodox economics including the normative bit was very purposefully recast as a “pure” science, with an ostensible aspiration to be “like physics.” In their zeal to be seen as scientists, many economists adopted some of the views of the philosophical “logical positivists,” who were famously so monomaniacal in their focus on empirical science they proposed at one point ethics was literal nonsense, unworthy of discussion. This led some economists to attempt to portray the normative or ethical content in neoclassical welfare economics as a positive analysis of certain words and concepts, with no implication anyone should attach normative significance to it, a sort of science of words, logic, math. Rather comically, the argument pertains to any ethical theory involving normative propositions expressed in words and related by logic, so all of them, which could then ostensibly be viewed as positive rather than normative theories, science rather than ethical philosophy. That bit of rhetorical tomfoolery is something I often refer to as the conceit of “positive normative” economics. It’s tomfoolery because it’s the presence of normative propositions that make a theory a normative or ethical theory, not the supposition anyone takes it seriously. It’s also transparently false. Economists themselves are the main audience for, and main proponents of, the ethical or normative ideas expressed. They clearly use them to make policy recommendations. The notion they’re simply helping others with their logic and math is false. No, the reality is what we now know as neoclassical economics retains two major components: a positive component, based ostensibly on empirical prediction, objective fact, science, and a normative component, based in subjective ethics, value propositions, etc. The critical discussion of the positive versus normative distinction follows suit, with one line of discussion addressing positive economics and deriving from philosophy of science, and one line addressing normative economics and deriving from ethical philosophy.

Let’s break it down. The first line of criticism of the notion neoclassical economics is a “pure” science as the old physicist wannabes proposed is that normative issues may influence the development of any science, such as science, but particularly a science about humans. This line of criticism is a theme from the philosophy of science, in which philosophers have proposed normative motivations may influence the practical conduct of science in various ways including individual scientists’ motivations, research agendas, funding, etc. In addition, some have floated the concept of “understanding” as an independent evaluative criterion for science, in addition to empirical prediction, and in any science but especially a science addressing humans, “understanding” may easily devolve into normative appealing storytelling, ideology. This line of criticism seems commonly presented as refuting or seeking to refute the positive versus normative distinction. However, I would suggest it doesn’t seek to refute the distinction at the level of propositions, but something a bit different. What it’s really refuting, or at least calling into question, is the idea of a purely positive science developed without normative influences, and especially but not necessarily exclusively in the case of a science about humans, without potential normative evaluation and effects via “understanding” / storytelling.

The second line of criticism of the notion that neoclassical economics is a “pure” science is that neoclassical welfare economics contains explicit, overtly normative propositions in a way other sciences do not, and thus, in fact, is not a science like physics. This line, of which I am a proponent, argues it’s vitally important to recognize this normative or ethical content as such because the proper methods of developing and evaluating normative arguments are fundamentally different from those of positive arguments. What sorts of differences are we talking about? One involves evaluation, which for a positive proposition, an “is” statement, involves objective fact, but for a normative proposition, an “ought” statement, involves evaluation relative to subjective moral sensibilities. A difference in methods is that false, simplifying assumptions are arguably acceptable in a positive “theory” / model empirically evaluated as a unit, while for an ethical theory to be appropriate to a particular context any factual premises must, in fact, be true. This line is not about denying interactions between positive and normative. A normative or ethical theory meant to apply to reality may be defined by the presence of normative propositions, but it will also contain positive elements: logic, factual premises, etc. Similarly, a positive theory may be about fact, but normative motivations and influences may intrude, and normative beliefs may complicate or distort empirical evaluation, as can the goal of generating normatively appealing storytelling, which some may simply suppose bad science. Positive economics can, of course, be “bad economics” in the sense of being flawed, compromised, ideologically motivated, inferior, pseudo-science. It’s not really my area, but it seems quite likely to me, and I support efforts to improve the science of positive economics. However, the “bad economics in the conservative style” I focus upon is explicitly normative economics, about what we ostensibly “ought" to do, not what “is,” about values, ethics, evaluation, optimality, welfare, goals, objectives, etc. It’s not about science, positive economics. The positive logic of normative economics seems to me pretty sound. It says what it says. However, I perceive a great deal of confusion about what it says, particularly about real world policy issues, which I suppose are generated and cultivated by confusing bits in that theory.

Those who delve into normative issues relating to positive economics, in the tradition of the philosophy of science, often suppose they’re refuting the claims of quaint old “economics is a purely positive science” rhetoric, and to some extent they are. However, by implying the only real issue is how normative issues can affect positive economics, implying normative economics does not present its own distinctive issues, such critics are, in a way, supporting the misleading rhetoric of the old economics as pure science camp. The two distinct lines of discussion about the presence, relation, interaction of positive and normative in economics, in terms of propositions, but also models, theories, broader normative effects, motivations, influences, etc., are complementary, not contradictory.

Democracy, Economic Power, And Government Capture

Conservatives in the USA are an interesting lot. They do all they can to ensure economic power has an outsized role in our democracy, then use “government capture” as a rationale to eliminate democracy. Let’s discuss that bit of rhetoric this week.

To understand the rhetoric, one must understand “conservatism” in the USA is actually composed of two rather different groups, one that loves the status quo distribution of economic power, and one that is critical of the status quo distribution of economic power. Both groups oppose democracy but for different reasons. The status quo group hates democracy because they think it may “interfere” with status quo economic power. The anti-status quo group hates democracy because they blame it for the status quo distribution of economic power. They can be tricky to distinguish not just because they’re both anti-democratic but because of clever rhetoric involving terms like “the free market.”

According to the status quo group, “the free market” is basically the current market but without democracy to interfere with it. This group typically doesn’t see a role for government addressing market failures, market structure, etc., because those are part of existing markets and government “interfering” on that basis is just as threatening to the status quo as any other sort of “interference.” The status-quo group tends to disparage democracy as “mob rule,” “collective” decision making, etc. They see democracy as potentially or actually effective, and threatening, harming, aggressive toward status quo economic power. That’s the group that supports economic power having an outsized role in our democratic system, opposes reform of campaign finance and lobbying laws, supports putting conservatives justices on the Supreme Court to get more rulings like Citizens United, etc.

In contrast, the anti-status quo group tends to view “the free market” as the “perfectly competitive market” of both real neoclassical welfare economics and anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style, supposing markets “freely” or naturally tend toward that model. Slightly more sophisticated members of this group may appreciate there’s no basis to suppose a “free” market will tend toward a perfectly competitive market, free of market failure, and will suppose a role for a technocratic, authoritarian government to address such issues. That latter group will not take the “free” in “the free market” literally, and will just think of the term as a funny, folksy way to refer to a perfectly competitive market, no matter how much work technocratic government may need to do to bring it about and sustain it. Alternatively, they may interpret “free” to apply not to the market, per se, but to the people participating in that market, so people in that particular market structure would be freer than they would be under other market structures or non-market decision systems like democracy. The anti-status quo group tends to disparage democracy by arguing it’s been “captured” or unduly influenced by the economically powerful, and that without democracy we would have a more ethically proper distribution of economic power, different from the status quo one. 

The interesting thing, of course, is that the anti-democracy activity of the first group, as far as strengthening the role of economic power in our democracy, is what actually fuels the anti-democracy sentiment of the latter group. It’s a cosy and convenient relationship.

For one who supports the democratic ethos, both forms of conservatism will be seen as flawed. The views of the status quo group are flawed because in any society the ethics of the definition, distribution, use of economic power must be addressed in some way. Under modern subjective secular ethics, the only ethically sensible way, the only stable way, to address those important issues is to refer to the always changing, always evolving views of the people in a particular society, the voters, that is, democracy. In that view, status quo economic power doesn’t have a “right” to that power that supersedes the democratic government and law that granted it in the first place, and democracy isn’t attacking, abusing, being aggressive when voters take another look and potentially revise things. The reasoning of the anti-status quo group is flawed for the same reason. Democratic government involving itself in ethical issues like the definition, distribution, use of economic power does not represent unethical “interference” with things that are none of its business. Addressing the ethical issues associated with economic power is what any and every government must do, and will always do, in any lawful, orderly society. It’s nonsense to portray it discharging its proper duties as “interfering” with past iterations of the same activity. Declaring one personally supports the ethics of the distribution of economic power one supposes will result without democratic government is perfectly fine, but what’s not fine is supposing one’s view must prevail over all others, which is inconstant with the democratic ethos.

The sensible response to concerns about any ethically undue influence of economic power in our democratic system, about “government capture” and so on, is to take steps to improve our democracy, limit the role of economic power, not eliminate democracy. The sensible path for conservatives concerned about ethically undue influence of economic power in our democracy is to take up the issue with the group most concerned to preserve and enhance that influence, their fellow conservatives, in the anti-democracy, pro-status quo camp.

Conservatism in the USA is rhetorically clever, sly, tricksy. To understand it, keep your eye on the ethics of the definition, distribution, use of economic power, and more recently who is meant to decide it, particularly the role of democracy. 

Utopian Anarchism

Can I just do another on politics before getting back to why I’m really here, the struggle against anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style? Because I was talking with some young people about utopian anarchism the other day and a few thoughts crossed my mind. There is a connection to my usual concerns because one common path to utopian anarchism leads through the fake anarchism of right wing “libertarianism,” which is itself a direct offshoot of anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style. Let’s discuss.

Recall two distinctive features of anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style is it obscures the role of economic power in social relations, and it obscures the ethical issues relating to economic power, which are exogenous to neoclassical welfare economics. A distinctive symptom of exposure to anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style is the conviction society is better, more ethical, if government endorses and expresses particular views on the definition, distribution, and use of economic power, but never delving into the ethical issues involved. “Libertarianism” takes suppression of the role of economic power and the related ethics, including the social ethics of the social mechanisms to address those ethics, government, democracy, to the next level, by supposing their take on the relevant issues implies greater “freedom” or “liberty.” “Libertarians” are famous for incorrectly and inappropriately using the rhetoric of utopian anarchism by pushing their own preferred arrangements relating to economic power so far in the background that, as a matter of rhetoric, they seem to disappear entirely for some people. For “libertarians” posing as anarchists, that is, fake anarchists, “government” is translated to government they don’t personally approve, “law” to laws they don’t personally approve or that interfere with ones they do approve, etc. It’s a sort of selection perception.

One path to utopian anarchism starts with attraction to the rhetorical use of the concepts of “freedom” and “liberty” in “libertarianism” / fake anarchism while failing to understand the rhetorical program, taking fake anarchism rather more literally than one ought. That’s not the only path to utopian anarchism to be sure. There’s also a nominally “leftist” path that runs through the old counter-culture “hippie” movement of the 1960s with their communes, etc. Utopian anarchism is funny that way. A mysterious place, where right meets left. It’s possible because the complete absence of government, law, actual anarchy, is traditionally neither “right” nor “left.” It’s just a chaotic state of nature in which the most ruthless, violent, egoistic individuals rise to the fore. The trick is what people imagine follows.

This leads to the distinctive undefined quality of utopian anarchism, in which some sort of utopia is introduced as the natural, inevitable result of anarchy, but the particular characteristics of the utopia are variable and bounded really only by one’s imagination. For “leftists" it can be a peaceable, small scale, authoritarian communism, some form of democratic socialism, direct democracy, etc. For “right wingers” it can be fascism, Social Darwinism and the reign of the “fittest,” a religious community, whatever. This is where utopian anarchism can start to become unintelligible to others because, for adherents, it’s not just or even mainly about the anarchy, it’s also about the utopia, which transforms the anarchy, and makes it, for them, “real” anarchy. With the misleading focus on anarchy, and the relative neglect of identifying and delving into the social organization, government, law, etc., particular adherents propose will appear naturally from anarchy, one sees immediately the rhetorical parallels to “libertarianism.” This odd, undefined quality seems generally taken as a good thing by utopian anarchists themselves. One fellow explained to me recently there are many branches on the tree of utopian anarchism, but what they all have in common is they all oppose tyranny, support freedom, etc. I found it largely unintelligible. So utopian anarchists have multiple, conflicting ideas about how to actually resolve interpersonal conflict of preferences, but all those ideas express “freedom” and the rejection of “tyranny?”  Sounds like word play to me.

The final observation I’d like to make about utopian anarchism is there seems a certain religious or faith-based quality to the ideology in the absolute certainty, despite all evidence to the contrary, the preferred utopia will appear on cue. In my experience, one can talk to a utopian anarchist all day long about what has actually been observed to happen when government and law breaks down, when countries fall into anarchy, but it won’t make any difference. Those weren’t “real,” it won’t happen that way next time. Indeed, one utopian anarchist proposed the only reason I doubted whichever utopia he was advocating would appear under anarchy was that I was thinking what “the system” wants me to think. The system wants me to appreciate law, government. I need to free my mind from the system. Ironically, the practical problem I see with utopian anarchists is that in their zeal to escape the ostensible yoke of political democracy, they play directly into the hands of economically powerful fascists, who are also working to bring down democracy. That’s why I quite often refer to utopian anarchists as tools of right wing fascists, apparently unwitting proponents of a decline in freedom and an increase in tyranny, the opposite of their stated or intended goals. It’s also why I requested the fellow concerned the system may have gotten to my mind to please be sure the system hadn’t gotten to his own mind, wasn’t encouraging his support for utopian anarchism for practical reasons, to further the cause of fascism.

The right wing anti-democracy ecosphere in the USA includes not just anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style, but a host of related ideologies and creeds, “Austrian” economics, “libertarianism” / fake anarchism, utopian anarchism, etc. Rarely do any of them advocate explicitly for authoritarian right wing government, fascism, but they all wish to see an end to our current democracy. In a practical sense, they all support the cause of the economically powerful and the rise of fascism in the USA. It’s why, when we speak of “fascists” in the USA, we’re not necessarily talking about the leaders who may explicitly advocate it. We’re also talking about their clueless tools, their helpers who, as often as not, sincerely suppose they’re fighting fascism.

What Is Fascism?

I’ve been getting rather more political than economical lately, but maybe just one more, to complete the set? Because I thought this week I’d say a few words about “fascism,” and what it means, to me, at least. What piqued my interest is the degree to which fascists in the USA seem to consider identification of their position as “fascism” empty name calling. One wonders if they’re just playing their usual rhetorical games, or if they really have a different understanding of fascism. Indeed, one right wing wag, apparently accustomed to calling pro-democracy liberals “fascists” when they support policies he or she doesn’t like, complained plaintively to me recently “everyone can’t be a fascist.” No, indeed. Let’s discuss who is, shall we? 

To understand fascism, one must first understand social power, in any lawful society at least, comes in two separable but related forms: political power, voting, etc., and economic power, the ability to resolve interpersonal conflicts over resources in one’s favor in markets. In terms of political power in isolation, one may contrast democratic government with non-democratic authoritarian government of whatever sort one wants to think about, monarchism, right wing fascism, left wing communism, etc. However, to understand the difference between types of authoritarian government, communism versus fascism in particular, one must move on to the views expressed on the definition, distribution, use of economic power (or alternatives) to resolve interpersonal conflict. Right wing fascism involves particular views on those issues, exogenous to neoclassical welfare economics. Similarly, left wing communism involves particular views on those issues, which differ from those of fascists. The main point here is just distinctive ethical positions on economic issue differing from those of fascists. Fascism and communism are just different forms of authoritarian government expressing different and conflicting views about the definition, distribution, use of economic power. Of course, everyone has views on those issues, even those who support democratic government. What moves one from being a valued citizen of a democracy expressing one’s views on the definition, distribution, use of economic power, to being a fascist or communist, is the determination one’s ethical views must prevail and democracy opposed if it suggests otherwise. Fascism has its Leader, Party, shadowy cabal of plutocrats, financiers, industrialists, etc. Communism has its Vanguard of Know It Alls, committees of local toughs, etc. They both have in mind that the people don’t really know what they’re doing, must be kept in check.

Historically, fascism was the response of certain people to a fear not just of authoritarian communism but the possibility voters in a democracy might deliver unwelcome verdicts on normative economic issues. It was both anti-communism and anti-democracy. Fascism in the past was associated with many peripheral side hustles designed to prop up and defend the fascist regime. These, I would suggest, do not speak to the essence of fascism, but are merely accidental adjuncts based in local conditions and expedience. The Nazis famously played the race card for everything it was worth, not only as a way to make money, but to appeal to the particular prejudices of a good part of the German population at that time. Italian fascists famously found it all rather odd, but went along, eventually. Fascists used a very deliberate policy of aggressive warfare as a sort of economic stimulus, a way to make a buck, for both the economic elite and the people, that didn’t involve re-distributing existing resources, which as right wingers they considered anathema. Fascists were forever concerned they might lose popular support, so they engaged in various sorts of social control, banned and burned books, interfered with public education and universities, restricted free speech, lied, controlled media, issued propaganda relentlessly. One important element of social control in fascist society was the secret police, the Gestapo, famously known in parts of the benighted American south as the “gazpacho police,” who didn’t just threaten political opponents with violence and murder but carried it out, and how. On the carrot side, fascists tried to maintain the conceit their regime was a welfare state, concerned with the welfare of the people, not just economically powerful fat cats, generals, political leaders, etc., so they embarked on social programs and policies of various sorts. The most prominent and famous fascist jobs and social program was, of course, the German military, where cannon fodder were assured a paying job until their number came up, and a hearty round of thoughts and prayers afterward, to the apparent satisfaction of all concerned. Again, these various add-ons do not speak to the essence of fascism, nor are they peculiar to it. What defines fascism is a rejection of democratic input into the definition, distribution, use of economic power, and the use of authoritarian government to enforce certain views.

Anti-democracy conservatives and Republicans in the USA, particularly when lambasting support for democracy as communism, leftism, etc., are classic fascists, and would be so even without the associated attraction to street thuggery, political violence, lying, racism, etc. Anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style is an important rhetorical tool for fascists in the USA because it suppresses awareness and understanding of economic power as such, and the role of democracy, political power, in defining and enforcing economic power. To appreciate democracy in an economic context, one must understand the limited, ethical half-theory structure of neoclassical welfare economics, the need for exogenous normative inputs, the modern secular understanding of ethics as based in the moral senses of individuals. Academic economists, by being soft on anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style, failing to forcefully repudiate it, have been the de facto primary advocates for fascism in the USA for many decades. They should be ashamed of themselves and change their ways. 

When will I ever talk stop talking about it? I sound like a broken record? Sure, I’ll stop. Some old day. Not any day soon, if fate allows. Get used to it. Or learn to use mute. I’m happy in my mountain home, shouting into the void. I could do it all day long.