Libertarianism And Fascism

I’m quite interested these days in the relationship between right wing, conservative “libertarianism” / fake anarchism and authoritarian fascism, linked by anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style. Let’s discuss that again this week. 

The usual litany of objections to democracy one hears from right wing “libertarians” is that democracy is ethically illegitimate, equivalent to a dictatorship, fascism, or alternatively to “mob rule,” collectivism, authoritarian communism, etc. Those sorts of arguments seem quite often to equate to the generalized anti-government arguments of true utopian anarchism, which makes one suspect confusion or bad rhetorical intent. However, I did recently encounter a somewhat more nuanced position. According to this fellow, “libertarianism” / fake anarchism wasn’t about the wholesale rejection of government or even just democracy, did not falsely pose as true utopian anarchism, it just saw certain “limits” to democratic government, a position he supposed I must support as well. In this fellow’s view, “libertarians” are special in the sense they’re “principled” about these limits of democracy, implying others have just informal or inchoate limits in mind. Yes, basically, it was yet another form of the conservative “everyone is doing it” argument. Of course, I pointed out that no, not everyone is doing it. In our current USA system, the ultimate and only real justification for law and government is the will of the people, and we can change every law, even the US Constitution, using democratic political mechanisms. 

What I think was going on was a conflation of personal support for particular laws, especially those involving defining the sphere of personal choice versus the restrictions of law, on the one hand, and support for the political mechanism for deciding that, on the other. Surely everyone has ideas, ultimately based in subjective and potentially idiosyncratic ethics, about what he or she thinks should be proscribed by law and what allowed, the proper relation of the individual and society, etc. Support for the democratic ethos involves the notion that in a society everyone’s views matter and thorny ethical disagreements temporarily, contingently settled by democratic government in law, potentially scrapped or revised in the future if the views of voters change, evolve. The authoritarian ethos, the general umbrella category of which fascism is one sort, says particular ethics of particular individuals should prevail, no matter the views of the rest of society. It leads to all manner of distinctive pathologies involving lying, control, etc.

Wanting to work within democracy to persuade voters to expand the realm of personal choice as much as reasonable, especially when no interpersonal conflicts are involved, but sometimes using ethical arguments even when they are, is part of traditional American “liberalism.” A great deal of social conflict in the 1960s and 70s was between “liberals,” who wanted to expand individual choice, get law out of areas they felt inappropriate, and “conservatives” whose wanted to maintain or enhance restrictions of personal choice by law in those areas. We can still see a pale reflection of that conflict today, with conservatives wanting to establish a state religion, supporting restrictions relating to discussing racism and other issues in schools,  opposing sexual and gender minorities, etc. I might oppose their efforts in the context of our present imperfect democratic system, but maybe they have the votes and maybe not, maybe they’ve gotten enough of their own on the Supreme Court and maybe not, maybe we have the votes to change the Constitution and maybe not, etc. I talk that way because I support democracy. Indeed, I wouldn’t mind making our system rather more democratic than it already is, if other voters agree. But alas not everyone supports the democratic ethos. Some people are egoists, authoritarians, fascists, “libertarians.” When they suspect democracy, other voters, may go against their views in certain areas, mostly relating to the definition of economic power (legal property “rights”), distribution of economic power, or use of economic power to resolve particular interpersonal conflicts of preferences (extent of the market), they reject democracy itself as the mechanism to resolve such issues. 

And what “principles” do those rejecting democracy suppose they’re expressing? Is it just whatever their personal ethics recommends on those particular issues? The same sort of “principles” everyone else uses to argue for their positions in the context of political democracy? Or do they purport to have principles of non-democratic government to match the principled basis of democratic government? There is only one objectively correct, timeless, True Ethics, and I know what it is? My way or the highway? Not sure I can take those all that seriously.

How do right wing “libertarians” get from point A to point B? How do they start out fretting about government power intruding into areas they don’t approve to supporting government power immune from the ethical opinions and beliefs of others, authoritarianism, fascism? I would suggest anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style plays an important role. It reduces understanding of the role of democratic government in providing necessarily normative inputs to market systems, treats democracy as unethical, unfortunate, unnecessary. One might say a great deal more about the yeoman work of purveyors of anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style in undermining support for democracy, increasing support for authoritarianism, fascism, but let’s talk more about that another day. 

Utility, That Fleeting Feeling Of Happiness, Or Whatever

Someone should write a book listing the various popular and folk economics definitions of “utility” in neoclassical economics. I recently read a good one: “fleeting feelings of happiness.” Next they’ll be telling me it’s the name of an old, old wooden ship. I know I talk about it often enough, but for a field that touts its own supposed rigor, it’s just very comical to see so many people so confused about such a fundamental concept. “So, what’s our theory about, anyway? Hmm. Not quite sure. Is it fleeting feelings of happiness?”

In neoclassical welfare economics, the only two definitions of “utility” that work in the context of the normative argument presented in that theory are preference ranks and inaccessible internal perceptions of satisfaction from preference fulfillment. That’s it. Those are the choices. Just choose one or do parallel discussions addressing both. It isn’t, and can’t be, just anything, whatever one likes, whatever some other people, philosophers, economists happen to be talking about at any given moment. Why only those? The ethical half-theory is predicated on the impossibility of resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences on the basis of “utility,” implying one must go outside that normative theoretical framework and take up exogenous ethical ideas to address that issue. That serves as the basis of the entire normative discussion of “economic efficiency” relating to “utility,” of Pareto optimality relating to “utility,” of perfectly competitive markets maximizing something called total social “utility,” etc. Neoclassical welfare economics is a defined normative or ethical theory, or as I say, half-theory, since some normative issues are very purposefully set aside. It’s not positive economics, a content-free toolbox, a funny way to refer to mathematics or logic, etc. 

In a more general philosophical context, there are a great many other potential definitions of “utility.” Indeed, that’s what a great deal of real utilitarian ethical philosophy is about; how to define “utility” so it makes sense in an ostensibly full ethical theory. That’s fine. Philosophy is interesting and fun. However, when one is working with neoclassical welfare economics, one is working with a defined normative or ethical theory. One isn’t just doing open ended ethical philosophy, deciding terms and concepts on the fly.

In so-called “general welfare analysis,” one can either incongruously manipulate one of those two types of “utility” to reflect some other type of “utility” or random ethical theory or, what the heck, if one is doing that, I suppose one could just redefine it however one likes. That’s also fine. “General welfare analysis” is basically economists doing what one supposes is often rather dodgy ethical philosophy. However, it’s not neoclassical welfare economics, which is a defined normative or ethical half-theory with defined concepts and terms.

Why am I always on about neoclassical welfare economics, per se? Because it’s been around a long time and has filtered into popular culture in the form of anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style and related forms of unhelpful, misleading folk economics. Economists would do well to stop talking nonsense to generate supposedly intuitive understandings of opaque, recondite, mysterious concepts. They’re not Yoda discussing The Force. They’re economists talking about “utility.” Be rigorous. Define it properly, then stick to it. A great deal of anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style involves blabbing on about conclusions generated in neoclassical welfare economics involving “utility” without any clear, consistent understanding of what those conclusions actually mean. 

Want an example? Contrary to what many seem to suppose, one cannot make interpersonal comparisons of “utility” using money or “willingness to pay.” Money is not “utility” or a measure of “utility.” Everyone gets that, right? Willingness to pay (an amount of money) might indicate preference rankings for a given individual, but comparing the willingness to pay of two different people tells one nothing about “utility,” that is, nothing normatively relevant to neoclassical welfare economics. Willingness to pay is often used in bad economics in the conservative style in a misleading way designed to blur the distinction between intrapersonal and interpersonal “utility” comparisons. Markets do not allocate resources to those who get the most “utility” from them. When speaking about resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences in markets, it’s much more sensible, much less misleading, to talk about relative economic power combined with at least a modicum of desire, rather than willingness to pay, and oh yes, almost forgot, ability to pay. In a market, interpersonal conflicts of preferences over possession or use of scarce resources will be handily won by those with vast economic power over those with little or no economic power. Their relative level of desire, want, need, etc., is irrelevant. Moreover, even if economic power were equalized, we could still not compare “utility” based on relative willingness to pay because we cannot make interpersonal comparisons of “utility” defined in either of the two ways relevant to neoclassical welfare economics. One may say that’s what one had in mind by relative desire, want, need, whatever, but that’s a different ethical theory, requiring concepts and propositions exogenous to the ethical half-theory in neoclassical welfare economics. That’s the point.

I’ve argued before serious economists may want to simply stop using the word “utility” and refer directly to either individual preference ranks or inaccessible internal perceptions of satisfaction from preference fulfillment to avoid confusion. If not that, at least have a care. If one wants to fight anti-democracy sentiment by helping people differentiate real neoclassical welfare economics from misleading anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style, pay attention to words, concepts, particularly in normative contexts. Try to be rigorous.

Social Power, Economic Power, And Political Power

A while back I addressed those many people in the USA with great concerns about social power in the form of political power but not at all in the form of economic power. I suggested economic power is just political power one step removed. I noted it may be useful for such people to view markets as a sort of political system for determining resource use in which people vote with dollars and some people have a great many more votes than others. I then noted the step beyond that is to consider how those dollar “votes” are defined, how they’re distributed, and what interpersonal conflicts of preferences they’re meant to resolve, who decides that, and on what basis. Voters, technocrats, priests, ethicists, economists?

I may have mentioned before that the ethical half-theory of neoclassical welfare economics requires certain exogenous normative, ethical inputs to generate normative results in the real world as opposed to the attenuated Fairy Land of Economic Theory. Those exogenous normative or ethical inputs relate to defining economic power, distributing it, and using it in markets to resolve particular interpersonal conflicts of preferences. There are a variety of views about the ethically proper origin of those exogenous ethical inputs. In any society, those inputs will be expressed in law or, absent law, in the acceptance of the law of the jungle, brute force. The process by which a society decides those ethical inputs is political in the broadest sense of the word. The democratic ethos is based on a modern secular understanding of ethics as based ultimately in the subjective moral sense or moral sensibilities of individuals. In that perspective, social ethics is something for one-person one-vote democracy to work out, express in law. Under the democratic ethos, nothing is ever final. All decisions are temporary, contingent, liable to change and evolve with the ever changing and evolving ethical views and understanding of the population itself. There is no interpersonally, objectively correct ethics.

In contrast, other perspectives reject democracy. Some suppose there is only one true, timeless expression of interpersonally, objectively, correct ethics that must be enforced even if some or all the people, in their ignorance, fail to understand or accept it. Some suppose we can obtain the necessary exogenous ethical inputs from non-human sources, from nature itself (Natural Law), from non-human supernatural entities (Divine Law), etc. Democracy obviously has little appeal for those with such beliefs. Although status quo social decisions about the definition, distribution, and use of economic power to resolve interpersonal conflicts of preferences are expressed in laws inherited from previous democratic government, under this view that has no independent ethical significance. Under this view, previous iterations of democratic government may have gotten it right, by coincidence or a supposed greater ethical insight or acuity of politicians or voters of an earlier age, but that implies nothing about the ethical status of democratic government now. Other perspectives rejecting democracy may suppose decisions about social ethics must be, and are in reality, made by humans, not simply received by them from external sources, but only certain qualified humans ought to make those decisions. According to these anti-democracy views, ethical decisions relating to the definition, distribution, and use of economic power must be received from non-human sources or made by qualified individuals, and must then be enforced on the people, against their will if necessary.

These conflicting views on the ostensibly ethically correct way to resolve normative or ethical issues or inputs relating to the definition, distribution, and use of economic power translate into what are essentially different and opposing political views on social power. One view of politics accepts the primacy of resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences using one-person one-vote democracy. The other accepts the primacy of resolving at least some interpersonal conflicts using one-person multiple-“vote” economic power in markets. One view of politics accepts that ethical inputs governing the definition, distribution, and use of economic power in markets expressed in law should be based on one-person one-vote democracy. The other suggests voters can’t handle that responsibility and must be kept in check. I suggest those who see government coercion, political power in expressions of one-person one-vote democracy, but not in the use of economic power in markets, are not being entirely honest about what distinguishes their political views from those who support democracy. The difference is not about freedom or liberty from government coercion, political power, it’s about who controls that government coercion, political power, and the ethical basis of that control. It’s about politics, specifically, democracy versus fascism.

True utopian anarchists, who reject law, legal property specifications, laws relating to markets, contracts, police, etc., are different. What they fail to appreciate, however, is their system, in reality, generates an equivalent coercion and social power by violent warlords. Thus, even utopian anarchism may be viewed as a preference for one form of coercion, social power, “politics,” over another. One may choose whatever one likes, of course. But do try to be honest about it. As for me, I’ll take democracy, the most sensible and stable of the lot.

One cannot simply wish away interpersonal conflicts of preferences. Every society must, and will, include some system to resolve them. If one wants to live under what one supposes an ethical system, one must make choices: law or anarchy, democracy or fascism, etc. I’m not telling anyone what their ethics should be. I know what makes sense to me, and I suppose others know what makes sense to them. But I am saying keep it real. Think and speak honestly. The strength of humanity is the word, communication, don't throw it away lightly.

The Paradox Of The Extent Of The Market And Distributional Ethics

Speaking of apparent economic paradoxes, I’ve been thinking recently about one involving the ethical issue of the extent of the market and its relationship to the ethical issue of the distribution of economic power. Maybe we can discuss that this week.

Let’s go back to the example I’ve been using recently to discuss the ethical issue of the extent of the market, the social decision to allocate vaccines by medical need rather than by economic power in markets. I mentioned before an interesting aspect of extent of the market issues is they can be converted in some sense to distribution of economic power issues. In our example, one could address the same issue by ensuring those with medical need have the requisite economic power to obtain the vaccine first on the market. I’m not suggesting it would be easy, practical, feasible, cost effective, etc. And such difficulties, if present, would generate additional interpersonal conflicts of preferences relating to resource use that would be exogenous to neoclassical welfare economics. However, I’d like to step back from such practical issues to think about the ethics involved at a more fundamental level, so let’s assume the economic power and market approach would be just as practical, easy, costly, feasible to implement as allocating the vaccine directly.

Based on the ostensibly uncontroversial normative propositions in neoclassical welfare economics, limited to attaching value to people attaining higher preference rankings, a purveyor of bad economics might propose the market solution clearly superior to the non-market one. However, that’s not what we actually observe, hence the apparent paradox. I, at least, recall very little serious ethical controversy or debate about allocating the vaccine directly by medical need rather than transferring the relevant economic power to those with medical need. Again, maybe it’s simply the perception of the practical difficulties involved. However, I doubt it. Other examples come to mind. Many support public education without seriously considering giving students the economic power they need to get an education or use as they like. People confronted with a panhandler commonly ask what he or she intends to use the money for, typically getting back a heated “Why do you care?” Why indeed? Are people so dense they can’t see the ethically obvious, uncontroversial solution?

What seems to be going on with this apparent paradox is we’re not really dealing with the normative proposition in neoclassical welfare economics relating to the expression of preferences in the absence of interpersonal conflict but something else a bit more controversial. If we were considering a one person world with that one person finding some vaccine, education, lunch, whatever, or the equivalent resources he or she could use for that or whatever else he or she liked, most would likely agree he or she would be better off in the latter case. However, we’re not. We’re talking about a world with interpersonal conflicts of preferences over scarce resources, and given the competing claims, people do sometimes appear to care how resources are used as part of deciding how to resolve those interpersonal conflicts. With the vaccine, the ethical concern may involve setting aside resources so people can address medical and health issues specifically, not setting aside resources so people with medical issues can maximize their “utility” by having a nice holiday before departing this world. With education, the ethical concern may involve setting aside resources for education for its own sake and so we aren’t surrounded by ignorant, unproductive, unethical simpletons, not setting aside resources so kids can maximize their “utility” by buying some new video games. With the panhandler, the ethical concern may involve setting aside resources to ensure people can at least get a good meal and hang in there one more day, not setting aside resources so they can maximize their “utility” by buying a bottle of Old Rot Gut to ease the pain. 

It’s just not very helpful when purveyors of bad economics jump in, ignore the implicit interpersonal conflict of preferences relating to the use of scarce resource, and explain to the subjects, contra de gustibus, they’re making bad ethical decisions. Indeed it’s confusing. As I’m so fond of pointing out, when one is doing ethics for an arbitrarily and artfully defined, restricted, contrived Fairy Land, one can’t simply turn around and apply it willy nilly to reality without making the necessary revisions and adjustments, which may be significant. Both the extent of the market and the distribution of economic power, like the definition of economic power, are ethical issues exogenous to neoclassical welfare economics. They both involve resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences. However, they’re separate issues. The distribution of economic power involves ethics relating to people directly, often fairness, justice, human welfare, etc. Extent of the market involves ethics relating to resource use and hence indirectly relating to other people, no matter their personal attributes. One can always at least theoretically convert an extent of the market issue into a distribution of economic power issue, thereby increasing the “utility” of the person on the receiving end, but other people are also involved, and depending on one’s ethics, one may not want to. Both issues pertain to resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences relating to resource use and ethics. Both issues involve at least potentially controversial ethics exogenous to the normative argument in neoclassical welfare economics. But they aren’t the same issue.

The Paradox of Purveyors Of Bad Economics As Ethical Arbiters

I was thinking recently of a sort of paradox involving the normative stylings of anti-democracy purveyors of bad economics in the conservative style, the de gustibus principle, and ethical “level problems” associated with actors and roles. Let’s discuss this week. The apparent paradox, or what seems like one to me, involves purveyors of bad economics explaining to all and sundry what we, as a society, should be doing as far as economic policy, often controversially, while ostensibly espousing a normative theory saying they’re not meant to second guess the preferences of subjects. Something doesn’t seem quite right, and even more troubling, the something that doesn’t seem quite right appears to involve the subjects of economic theory, their ethical views, and democracy. Interesting to think how purveyors of bad economics arrive there, what’s going on. What I suspect is causing the issue here is related to an issue I discussed recently in the context of the “methodological individualism” critique of neoclassical welfare economics, specifically, different levels of ethical thinking involving different implied actors and roles.

Theoretical neoclassical welfare economics involves at least three implied actors: economists, non-economist observers to serve as their interlocutors, and arbitrarily defined and constrained ciphers serving as subjects. The distinction is usually quite apparent in a theoretical context, where it’s clear economists are talking with other observers about an arbitrary, artificial, otherworldly creation I call the Fairly Land of Economic Theory, populated by arbitrary, artificial, otherworldly subjects I call ciphers. If we consider a “one-person” world with no interpersonal conflict, we’re not conventionally thinking of a world with just an economist. We’re thinking about a world with a subject plus implied economists and observers looking in and talking about some ethical ideas. Similarly, when discussing interpersonal conflicts of preferences in a theoretical context, we generally have in mind conflicts of preferences between the subjects, not between one of the subjects and the economist himself or herself or other observers.

As I discussed in the context of the “methodological individualism” critique, one of the otherworldly characteristics of the ciphers appears to be they’re not meant to have preferences relating to social ethics to compete with those of economists or other observers. I discussed the difficulties introduced into the normative argument of neoclassical welfare economics if we have interpersonal conflicts of preferences on the part of the subjects that relate to the ethical results economists themselves are trying to establish for observers. This allows the economist to talk about ethics at one level, about what “society” ought to do, while at the same time upholding the de gustibus principle saying economists are not meant to second guess the preferences of the subjects, including about ethics, at another level. When we talk about certain ethical issues being exogenous to the normative argument of neoclassical welfare economics in a theoretical context, we have in mind the implied non-economist observer addressing those issues, not the ciphers themselves.

However, the economist, other observer, subject distinction, so clear in the Fairy Land, becomes fraught and indistinct in reality. People, real subjects, as opposed to ciphers, have social ethics, and an economist or observer can be a subject, part of the system being studied. This often leads to a certain amount of confusion. For example, is the intended audience for economists’ normative advice the subjects themselves, contra de gustibus? Are we including the utility of the preferences of economists and observers along with those of the subjects? Are all what seem factual premises appearing in neoclassical welfare economics actually factual premises, about what subjects are doing, or are some of them normative inputs, ethical propositions, about what economists propose subjects ought to be doing?

These issues arise from doing ethics for an artificial Fairy Land then trying to apply it to reality without making the necessary adjustments, an issue in turn related to conflating methods appropriate to studying positive and normative issues in neoclassical welfare economics. Although it's easy enough to become confused by the differences between ethical thinking for the Fairy Land of Economic Theory and ethical thinking for the real world, there is one bedrock normative proposition one can use to anchor oneself. “Utility,” as defined in neoclassical welfare economics, cannot be used to resolve interpersonal conflicts of preferences over anything, resources, ethics, whatever, between anyone, subjects, subjects and economists, subjects and other observers, etc. If one doesn’t have that, one doesn’t really have neoclassical welfare economics. One may have some other sort of “economics,” plenty of them about, but one doesn’t have the form of economics that supports what I refer to as anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style. Why? Because it’s a necessary input for the argument in anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style that it’s all about getting to any perfectly competitive market outcome, never mind ethics, human welfare, fairness, the views of the subjects, observers, democracy.

One resolves the paradox by acknowledging the differences between doing ethics or giving policy recommendations for the Fairy Land and for reality, between abstract theoretical ciphers and real people, between ethical half-theories and full ethical theories. Neoclassical welfare economics may be ethically dispositive in the artfully constructed Fairy Land, but it says basically nothing on its own in reality, referring all significant ethical issues to resolution by democratic government. Don’t get it twisted. One can, of course, have honest conservative economics, based on explicit ethical or normative propositions and inputs, which one would not classify as bad economics in the conservative style because it would not falsely impersonate neoclassical welfare economics. Anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style creates a great deal of unnecessary confusion and conflict in our world. We should address it, fix it, help people overcome it and avoid it, with or without the help of economists. It’s really a job for everyone.