Anti-Democracy Conservatism And Economic Power

I thought this week I might delve a bit into the anti-democracy movement in the context of conservatives with and without economic power and their attitudes toward the economic status quo, issues I think create much confusion among liberals and “leftists.”

When thinking of the relationship between anti-democracy conservatives and the economic status quo, the economic establishment, it seems advantageous to distinguish initially between economically weak and economically powerful conservatives, as their views are quite different. Of the two groups, I suppose the easiest to understand is that composed of economically powerful conservatives, who seem clearly to oppose democracy because they suppose their own economic power may be negatively affected by voters enacting unwelcome economic policies. One important way voters may do that is by using the authority of democratic government to tax the economically powerful and use that money for programs, policies that help the economically weak. So this group is typically all about opposing taxation and government spending. Although they may prefer democratic government not exist, at least if they feel they can reliably dominate whatever authoritarian government does exist, as a fall back positions they may support small, inactive, inert democratic government or one dominated by economic power. As for views on the ethics of economic power, they support their own economic power, often relying on bad economics in the conservative style or its sequelae, proposing it the result of ethically dispositive markets, their own merit, and so on. So are these economically powerful anti-democracy conservative pro or anti status quo, pro or anti establishment? Well, that seems a judgment call. They support it well enough, to a certain degree, but they suppose they might do rather better still if we eliminated democracy. Differences between this group and liberals are the usual suspects: the ethics of economic power, the nature of ethics in general, and the role of voters, democracy, the US Constitution in addressing those ethics, generating laws, and factual issues relating to real markets.

The more interesting case, to me at least, is the group composed of anti-democracy economically weak conservatives. They often hold similar views on economics as their economically powerful comrades but their relationship can be complex and fraught. Economically weak conservatives tend to see markets as ethically dispositive, join the economically powerful in opposing other economically weak people trying to use democratic government to improve their situation, feel it unethically diverts economic power away from themselves. However, things get more interesting in the context of attitudes toward the currently economically powerful, where attitudes may become complex, divisive, one factor surely encouraging these conservatives to focus more on the easy case of attacking the (other) economically weak.

One faction opposes the economically powerful, sees their economic power as also generated by their influence over democratic government and thus also unethically diverting money away from themselves. They propose fighting democracy is also fighting the economically powerful. One disagreement this group has with liberals is liberals support democracy and see the answer to the influence of economic power over democratic government as reducing that influence, making democracy better, while these conservatives see that as impossible or ill-advised. When they see it as ill advised, it again likely has to do with that fact that even if the role of economic power in our democracy were reduced, the demands of the economically weak delivered via voting would remain for them a significant problem. Another disagreement involves the nature of the proposed alternative form of government this group of conservatives proposes superior to even improved democracy, its resistance to economic power, and the ethics and facts of the markets it is meant to create and enforce.

The other faction supports the currently economically powerful and may be further divided into corporatist and pro-“free market” factions. The corporatist faction supports the influence of economic power in government, likes monopoly, Citizens United, that sort. While these conservatives may not be pro-“free market” in one sense, they may be at least pro-market in another sense, seeing real, existing economic results, markets in ethical terms. They’re often business and technocratic types who worship economically powerful businesspeople. Disagreements with liberals for this group includes not just the role of democracy, but even conventional economic thinking about the potential benefits of competition and so on, with ethics focusing more on Social Darwinism, natural selection, etc. 

The faction that supports the economically powerful on a pro-“free market” basis is also divided. One group ignores the role of economic power in our current economic system and supports those with economic power because they propose we have ethically special markets now. Disagreements between this group and liberals involves the ethics of economic power, the role of democracy, but also factual matters relating to real markets, the extent to which they currently reflect theoretical “perfectly competitive” markets. Then we have a final group of pro-“free market” conservatives who support those currently having economic power not because we already have an ethically special market now, but because they suppose the economically powerful are trying to create one against their own interests. This group envisions a conservative authoritarian government, small fascism, they suppose may enforce ethically special “free markets” against both the demands of economically weak voters and the machinations of the economically powerful operating through democratic government. Disagreements between this group and liberals includes the ethics of economic power, the role of democracy, and again the nature of the proposed conservative authoritarian government meant to be immune from economic power that oversees ethically special “free markets.” All the various factions of anti-democracy conservatives who promote ostensibly ethically special “free markets” may be incorrectly referencing arguments relating to theoretical “perfectly competitive markets” in the ethical half-theory of neoclassical welfare economics.

Why am I saying all this? I’m just trying to establish the anti-democracy conservative movement even only as it applies to economic matters, setting aside bad religion and racism, is a complex, multi-faceted affair. A Hydra with many heads. It must be addressed accordingly.

Bad Economics In The No Conflict Case

I generally discuss the problem of bad economics in the conservative style in the context of interpersonal conflicts of preferences but only rarely in the ostensible no conflict case. However, it causes problems even there. Maybe we can discuss that this week.

The easy case as far as the normative argument expressed in neoclassical welfare economics is when there are no interpersonal conflicts of preferences to resolve and indifference to others’ choices based on their individual preference ranks is meant to be ethically a slam dunk. The idea one has no ethical justification for interfering in another’s behaviors, choices, if they don’t conflict in a sufficiently serious way with one’s own situation or those of others, is a commonly accepted ethical proposition in our society. However, and this is really my theme for today, the issue is not nearly as simple or straightforward in reality as it is in the context of the normative argument of neoclassical welfare economics, ethical propositions meant for what I often call the Fairy Land of Economic Theory. Why? Because neoclassical welfare economics involves the assumptions the ciphers standing for people in that theory are perfectly rational and have perfect information, which essentially eliminate any awkward, potentially problematic cases in that area.

Note in the context of normative economics those assumptions are not presented as factual premises. If they were they could easily be proven false. They’re arbitrary assumptions used to define the context in which the ethical propositions are meant to be considered, evaluated. Note also we’re specifically not discussing positive economics about predicting empirical phenomena. I’ve commented before on the legitimate use of “false but simplifying assumptions” in predictive engineering models, if not social “science,” per se. That’s not our issue today. In the context of normative economics, problems occur when one conflates the Fairy Land for reality, that is, mistakes what in realistic contexts is the ethical half-theory of neoclassical welfare economics for the ethical full-theory of bad economics in the conservative style. These problems notably occur when one considers realistic situations involving people who are not perfectly rational or do not have full information and proposes, discusses, evaluates arguments relating to one’s ethical responsibilities toward those people.

Let’s have an example to consider. I recently watched a TV program about hoarding behavior that included commentary from both a mother, who had suffered severe psychological trauma as a child and likely as a result had developed hoarding disorder, and her adult daughter. The daughter explained she had long resisted becoming involved or trying to intervene in her mother’s situation because she felt it was not her place; it was simply her mother’s preferences, her choices, and she had no real ethical justification to get involved herself. Interestingly, after seeing the results of her non-involvement, observing her mother’s struggles, mental anguish, suffering, she changed her ethical thinking on the issue. She said she now rued the long years of inaction and benign neglect, wishes she had gotten involved sooner. The mother, for her part, was adamant no one else was to blame for her situation and she had simply chosen to engage in hoarding behavior. It was her own volition, her own choice, she insisted over and over again, clearly full of feelings of deep shame and self-loathing. One may see immediately the typical ethical perspective associated with bad economics in the conservative style even without confirmation the case involved a place and social milieu that experience suggests might be particularly susceptible to such rhetoric. 

They both developed a new ethical perspective once science entered the room in the form of a psychologist, who explained mental disorders as hoarding were not rational personal choices but often had subconscious psychological origins that must be dealt with on that basis. The ending seemed happy enough. The daughter determined to help her mother more with her issues, and the mother appeared to finally let go of some of the shame and self-hatred that prevented her seeking help. Just one case, obviously, but it seemed to me of wider application. The initial ethical reasoning of mother and daughter are a common enough conservative perspective that could just as easily have been applied outwardly to, say, a homeless person sleeping rough. “Why does she choose to do that? What is it anyone’s business if she lives or dies?” And the homeless person herself, maybe also full of shame, self-hatred, determined to establish to herself and others she accepts full responsibility for her behavior, choices, agreeing she deserves to suffer, but maybe taking something to ease the pain when she can. Any serious ethics must address the fact real people are not fully rational and rarely if ever have full information. It must confront the awkward, difficult cases when people are irrational, mentally unwell, confused, misled, conned, ignorant, addicted, under duress, and so on.

And consider the role of interpersonal conflicts of preferences, so significant in neoclassical welfare economics. Was there not a conflict of preferences between a daughter wishing her mother well and her mother’s preferences under hoarding disorder, a conflict based on love? Is it even sensible in the real world to propose an absence of sentiment toward others in one’s society? To propose no conflict of preferences when one sees another under duress, suffering, possibly ignorant or not thinking correctly, engaged in self harm? I’m not sure it is. So in reality the situation in which no interpersonal conflicts of preferences exist is really just whenever one determines, based on one’s ethics and true factual premises, one should not interfere in another’s behavior. It’s not objective fact but subjective ethical judgment. Here again one may easily lose the plot in reality when thinking of the ethics for the Fairy Land as studied in neoclassical welfare economics. Do the ciphers in the Fairy Land even have preferences about ethics? Are they even meant to have or know about ethics?

Back in reality, one doesn’t care to interfere in another’s behavior, but also one doesn’t care to reject one’s love and concern for those who may be struggling nor allow the strong in some way to prey upon the weak. It’s a bit more complicated than individual preference ranks. Just some things to mull over some cold winter's night: the differences between the Fairy Land and reality, ethical full-theories and ethical half-theories, the normative program of neoclassical welfare economics and of bad economics in the conservative style.

What Puts The Far In Far Left And Far Right?

I’d like to talk a bit more this week about a question I posed in a poll a while back about what people suppose the “far” in expressions like "far right” and “far left” refers to. I find it an interesting issue that complicates political discourse in the USA.

“Left” and “right” in the USA are conventionally defined in economic terms, specifically the ethics of economic power, although other issues, random cultural issues, a surprising number of them, are often added on, one supposes for rhetorical effect. If one hews closely to the economic foundation of right and left in the USA, one may reasonably wonder what to make of discussions of the far left and far right. Who cares? Only there seems some underlying controversy about it in the USA.

I propose one common take is people enter the Realm of Far when they’re so concerned to express their views on the ethics of economic power they demand their view prevails, stop supporting democracy, so authoritarian fascism far right and authoritarian communism far left. Under this view, there is a very powerful far right in the USA, with one of our two major political parties, millions of party members, more-or-less openly fascist, opposed to democratic government, keen to support conservative views on the ethics of economic power. Also under that definition, one may say there is currently basically no far left in the USA. No prominent politicians or parties, very few voters, endorse or promote communism as authoritarian government in ostensible support of leftist views on the ethics of economic power.

Interestingly, however, many far right (under this definition) anti-democracy fascists in the USA propose their opposition to democracy is required to fight what they propose is a very powerful far left. Are they just talking rot or using words in a different way? Might anti-democracy conservatives interpret the “far” in far left to refer not to views on democracy but something else, say particular views on the ethics of economic power or economic policy they find especially offensive? Voters seem to have various views on the ethics of economic power, economic policy, the proper goals of the economy, and so on, so if some subset of those may be designated “far left,” then one might propose the USA does indeed have a powerful “far left.”

One may suppose, in that case, to support what some may view as the momentous decision to oppose democracy, the US Constitution, one must perceive a very notable difference between acceptably left views on the ethics of economic power and especially noxious far left views. But I can’t say I honestly have any notion what that distinction is meant to be. We seem to be having the same sort of economic discussions we’ve had for years relating to the ethics of the definition, distribution, use of economic power. What is this new element of “far?” The mystery of the distinction of left and far left may suggest we’re on the wrong track. On the other hand, if conservatives don’t care much about democracy, the US Constitution, they will not see opposing those a momentous decision but a rather trivial affair. Indeed, if democracy is insignificant, far left may just be a rhetorically exaggerated way of saying left, one may have nothing particular in mind with the qualifier, may just slap it on to be dramatic. So perhaps the question is simply the significance of democracy?

I think perhaps what conservatives who profess to perceive a far left in the US are saying is simply other voters have views on the ethics of economic power they disagree and they feel justified opposing democracy to stop them. It’s not a matter of limits on acceptable left-ness. Indeed, I suppose it likely many conservatives have no particular notion of far left in mind and use it merely as a rhetorical device, perhaps hoping others may equivocate on terms and suppose far left means anti-democracy, authoritarian communism. 

When one hears alarming talk about a supposedly powerful far left operating in the USA, one should stop, take a breath, think about how one would define the far left oneself, and then think about what others may have in mind, and how it relates to political democracy.

Oh, the poll results? About 67 percent thought the “far” in far right and far left referred to the rejection of democracy, as fascism and communism. However, 22 percent thought it referred to particular takes on economics and 11 percent to relative enthusiasm. (N=9)