Anarchism, Fascism, and Bad Economics

One of the more interesting aspects of the current anti-democracy movement in the USA is the counter-intuitive alliance of anarchists and authoritarian fascists mediated through anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style. Let’s discuss that this week.

I would say anarchists working with fascists, along with radical conservatism and “small fascism” with no or at least obscure welfare state pretensions, represent the most novel issues presented by modern right wing anti-democracy sentiment in the USA. I’ve discussed radical conservatism and small or small government fascism in previous posts and will assuredly do so again. I’ve also discussed the relation of anarchism and fascisms in the USA, but I’m not sure I’ve done a committed blog post on the issue lately. I previously proposed anarchism shares with authoritarian creeds as fascism, theocratism, the supposition the fundamental social issue is accommodating egoism via the cultivation of a unified collective rather than accommodating diversity of ethical thought. It’s an interesting issue to me because here in the USA anarchists are important allies of right wing, conservative fascists and theocratists seeking to end democracy, terminate the US Constitution, yet are often conceived to be opposites on the scales of political sentiment. Some, of course, are fake anarchists or crypto-fascists who assume government and law they personally support or suppose they will arise spontaneously from the ashes of democracy, so anarchism to them just means government, law they approve, without democracy to mess it up. The commonality there seems obvious. But there are also what seem to me true anarchists who don’t try to sneak government, law into their vision of anarchy. They, I think, are the more interesting case as far as establishing commonalities with authoritarian government as fascism.

There seem to me two groups of true anarchists: those who see ostensibly beneficial social Darwinism in a battle of all against all, and those who foresee a common social will and ethics arising that allows people to cooperate peacefully with no laws or law enforcement. Although all fake and real anarchists propose they’re touting something quite good, utopias, I tend to think of those who foresee the rising of a common will and ethics obviating law as the most stereotypically utopian in the sense of far-fetched and otherworldly. My point today is that all forms of anarchism, including perhaps most counterintuitively those I would call true utopian anarchists, are rather closer in spirit to supporting authoritarian creeds like fascism, theocratism, than to supporting the ethos of democracy. All forms of anti-democracy conservatism, including true utopian anarchism, are fundamentally egoistic. Their primary concern is government may promulgate laws they don’t personally approve, which when applied to them generate what is for them a sort of tyranny. The different strains of conservatism differ in how they propose resolving that difficulty. Fascists and theocratists suppose it’s a matter of right minded government, with fake anarchists / crypto-fascists suggesting it may arrive spontaneously once democracy dies. Explicit fascists and theocratists see the issue more in terms of gaining control of government. All are concerned to make sure law comports to what they would choose to do in every particular, thus eliminating the tyranny of respecting laws they don’t personally approve. True lawless anarchists see value, as an absence of government tyranny, in a bloody war of all against all over resources or in a mystical coming together in agreement on the requisite ethical issues relating to allocating resources, resolving interpersonal conflicts, etc. They’re all opposed to accepting diversity in ethical thought, having people discuss and debate laws, create laws that may evolve this way or that depending on changing views of voters, respecting laws one might not entirely agree because of the system under which they are made.

The democratic ethos requires granting significance to the views of other people, accepting that others may not initially or even ever agree one’s ethical views in every particular, other voters may support laws one supposes ill advised or ethically dodgy. The democratic ethos is about finding a real, practical way to make a thriving human society even with such diversity in thought, relating to ethics, what society is about, what an economic system should do, where resources should go, all that. It seems quite possible to me real support for the democratic ethos may relate to accepting the notion ethical views are fundamentally subjective judgments of individuals, not objective, empirical facts with one correct answer one should enforce, one way or another. That is to say, it seems to me support for the ethos of democracy may require the ability to make a distinction between private ethics, what one supposes is ethical and right, and the social ethics of living in a society with people who may think differently. A two level issue. In that sense, one may say the issue conservatives have with the concept of diversity is rather more fundamental than the cultural and “racial” issues normally discussed. It may relate most significantly to diversity of thought as ethics, freedom in that area. Under the ethos of democracy, one faces an ethical issue of how far law agreed by other voters may diverge from one’s own ethics before one decides anti-social criminality ethically justified, given the adverse consequences for society. One doesn’t care to set the bar too low. In that context, those who understand and support the ethos of democracy may perceive many or most conservatives as unreasonable prima donnas who see society breaking tyranny everywhere, as public health measures, public education, taxes, street lights, what have you.

It’s not difficult to see the origin or at least reflection of these themes in the ethical half-theory of neoclassical welfare economics, in which the thorny normative, ethical issues addressed by democracy are set aside, and more so in misinterpretations of that theory. In bad economics in the conservative style, neoclassical welfare economics is cast as a full ethical theory, or at least added normative inputs relating to economic power are not adequately identified, leading to people not understanding, appreciating the role of democracy. Typical consequences are to suppose interpersonal ethics unnecessary, egoism good, democracy unnecessary, no power relationships exist in market contexts, economic policy should not be up for a vote, and particular ethics, laws on economic power represent “freedom” in general. It’s why I think it’s ineffective to think of our current crises in democracy in a quotidian political horse race context, about this candidate or that. It’s really about ideas: philosophy, ethics, values, economics. The crisis will persist until the underlying issues addressed. And in that realm of ideas, one must appreciate the close relationship of anarchism, both fake and real, to conservative, right wing, authoritarianism as fascism, Christo-fascism, theocratism, moderated through egoism and anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style.

For reference, I did fun blogs post on the other novel issues I mentioned earlier. A post on radical or revolutionary conservatism at https://hanselkrankepantzen.blogspot.com/2023/01/revolutionary-conservatism.html and one on “small fascism” at https://hanselkrankepantzen.blogspot.com/2023/06/small-fascism.html, but I discuss them often enough.

Willingness To Pay And Bad Economics

I thought this week I might say a few words about the concept of “willingness to pay” as used in bad economics in the conservative style. I tend to see quite a lot of confusion about what it means, its normative significance, among conservatives especially. I’ve been meaning to write something on this for a while now, ever since someone purporting to be an academic economist informed me economic power has nothing really to do with market outcomes, the only thing that matters is “willingness to pay.” He or she explained that’s why poor people can buy cell phones, fancy coffee, and so on, the idea being the poor can easily enough get whatever they want, as long as they have the requisite “willingness” to have it. I found it remarkable. Let’s discuss the rhetoric.

First, note the concept of willingness to pay, in general, without some budget, ability to pay, economic power to put bounds on it, is meaningless. How much would I be willing to pay for product A? Well, I don’t know. A gazillion dollars? Two gazillion? How about this one? “How much would you be willing to pay for A? $10? Fine, I’d be willing to pay $11, so give it to me. Give you the money? Can’t. Haven’t got any.” Do you see where I’m going with this? To be sensible, economic power must ground willingness to pay. So really, as many have pointed out, “willingness to pay” used in realistic contexts is always “ability and willingness to pay.” It’s never just a generalized willingness. In market systems, people don’t get whatever they want, even they want it quite a lot.

Next, let’s talk about the normative significance of this ability and willingness to pay given the normative argument in neoclassical welfare economics based on individual preference ranks as “utility.” Recall utility is only relevant for a given individual, not interpersonally. Thus, in that theory, the fact individual X is able and willing to pay more for good A than good B is normatively significant. It suggests good A is higher on X’s preference ranking that good B or in the funny talk of economics, individual X “gets more utility” from A than B. Now consider what happens if we make an interpersonal comparison of ability and willingness to pay for two people, X and Y. What can we say about who would get more “utility” from good A if X is able and willing to pay more than Y? Nothing. “Utility” doesn't work that way. That is, what can we infer about “utility” as the individual preference ranks of X and Y relative to good A? Again, nothing. Obviously. It’s an interpersonal utility comparison in the guise of willingness to pay, and such comparisons are undefined or impossible in that theory. As many have pointed out, that corresponds to casual thinking about the ethics of the situation. Say X is able and willing to pay $1 M from a budget of $1 B, while Y is able and willing to pay only $1 K, but that’s his or her entire budget. Who wants, desires, needs it more?

What’s going is people are pulling a fast one and swapping out “utility” for economic power, money. However, the ethics relating to the definition, distribution, and use of economic power to address interpersonal conflicts are external to neoclassical welfare economics. If we’re making that swap, we’re leaving neoclassical welfare economics and taking up bad economics in the conservative style, in which additional normative propositions related to economic power are slipped in without proper identification, discussion, evaluation. Again, it doesn’t have to be bad economics in the conservative style. One might explicitly say, we’re leaving neoclassical welfare economics and introducing potentially controversial normative or ethical propositions about economic power A through Z, so let’s discuss them. It’s only “bad” economics in the sense I mean here if one tries to do it on the sly, is tricky about it, pretends one is talking about neoclassical welfare economics then, hey presto, suddenly is not. Then it’s not sincere ethical philosophy, it’s just misleading rhetoric.

When one hears anyone gushing about how special approximations of perfectly competitive markets are because they cleverly direct resources to their most valued use, keep in mind they mean valued under some preferred ethical views relating to economic power, not generally. If they attach any normative or ethical significance to that “value,” they’re making some sort of normative argument about ethics and laws relating to economic power, external to neoclassical welfare economics, which markets simply pass through and express. Neoclassical welfare economics does not actually propose it’s normatively or ethically superior to allocate scarce resources to castles on Mars or mega-yachts rather than to houses for the homeless, food for the hungry, care for the sick, education for the ignorant, and so on. Watch for that switch between the concept on which neoclassical welfare economics is based, “utility” as preference ranks of individuals, inapplicable in interpersonal contexts, with proposed stand-ins like economic power, money, word games involving “value,” and so on.

It’s a linguistic and conceptual minefield out there. Needn’t be, shouldn’t be, but conservative economists seem committed to making it one, most likely to support bad economics in the conservative style and promote their own views on the ethics of economic power in tricky ways.