Revolutionary Conservatism

I’ve probably mentioned equivocation on the term “conservative” that can make radical, revolutionary conservatism seem an oxymoron, but someone reminded me of it again the other day, so maybe I can take another shot at that this week? Word games relating to “conservatism?”

One definition of “conservatism” is basically value free except for the one value of supporting the status quo, never mind what it is, just a sort of generalized resistance to change. Under that definition, the idea of a radical or revolutionary conservatism is contradictory and indeed an oxymoron.

Another definition of “conservatism” involves particular values conventionally pertaining to economics involving things like the mechanisms for distributing economic power, property, property rights, markets, how to resolve interpersonal conflicts of preferences, allocation of resources, etc. This is the sense of “conservative” that appears in my formulation “anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style.” These “conservative values” are not constrained to be economic in nature and may sometimes involve various other matters such as religion, racism, nativism, misogyny, a hatred for sexual and gender minorities, anti-intellectualism and so on, but it’s not really relevant here. Under this sense of “conservative,” it’s perfectly sensible to talk about radical or revolutionary conservatives who perceive the status quo as unacceptably lacking in the relevant conservative values and want sudden, drastic correction.

Now when conservatives of the conservative values camp think the status quo properly exhibits conservative values, they may appear conservative in the other sense of opposing change, supporting the status quo, but that’s a matter of coincidence. It needn’t be the case. Currently, in the USA, we have a curious hybrid “conservative” movement: One branch supports the status quo, some possibly because they perceive it consistent with “conservative values,” supports the existing establishment elite and opposes democracy because voters might change that status quo. The other branch opposes the status quo because they suppose it does not reflect conservative values and they blame voters and “activist” democratic government for that unfortunate result, and thus want either inactive, ineffective democratic government or non-democratic government. The conservative movement is in no hurry to resolve the issue of the relationship of status quo economic outcomes, as the establishment elite, to conservative values, because both branches want to end democracy, albeit for different reasons, so they work well together just now. One supposes eventually the faction favoring the status quo establishment elite, economic power, will prevail, given their resources, and indeed that is what we’re seeing, as Lord Dampnut regularly ignores traditional conservative economics, although his rhetoric is inconsistent on that point. It’s why some “conservatives” seem a bit confused and may be seen asking themselves whether Lord Dampnut is a “true” conservative. Yes, and no. Surely, he’s one type of conservative, albeit possibly not the other, but as long as one supports his efforts to end democracy, maybe that’s enough?

One saw the same pattern in fascism in Europe in the early to mid 20th century. Some fascists supposed voters, democracy might change the status quo and were concerned to prevent it. Others supposed the status quo already flawed and were concerned to change it. This fundamental disagreement within original fascism about the status quo establishment elite was resolved in Nazi Germany through violence, of course, when the status quo, establishment elite friendly wing led by Mr. Hitler turned against what they saw as the rather overly radical elements of the SA. 

I don’t think it too important given the shared goal of ending democracy to fret much about the meaning of “conservatism” writ large. Both are unfortunate. Conservative values are fairly well-defined if a bit variable. Traditional conservative economics is well defined. Liberals oppose “conservatism” in both senses. They reject the notion we should blindly support the status quo, resist change, that change is inherently bad. They support democracy with its potential for change. They reject traditional “conservative values” including bad economics.

What’s my point? I suppose just don’t get distracted by verbal equivocation or conflation of issues, rhetorical techniques conservatives use to sow confusion and conflict, manipulate others. Yes, “conservatism” can mean different things. Disambiguate as necessary. Otherwise, carry on.

Don’t Say Utility Challenge

Have I thrown down the “Don’t Say Utility Challenge” recently? Because I really think that’s one thing that might help some understand the tricky wordplay in neoclassical welfare economics and hence also anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style.

If you follow my writing at all, you’ll know I propose there is one reason and one reason only economists refer to individual preference ranks using the term “utility,” and that is to mislead and confuse people by engaging in a game of terminological equivocation for rhetorical purposes. I propose anyone teaching, reading, discussing modern neoclassical welfare economics replace the word “utility” with the phrase “preference rank of individual X” or the equivalent. They’re meant to be identical concepts in modern formulations of neoclassical welfare economics. 

To follow my post this week, one must reject the insincere rhetorical jape one hears from bad economists that “utility” in neoclassical economics is undefined, can mean many things or whatever one likes. Yes, in philosophy many proposed definitions. In economics, only a couple of definitions work. I’m talking here about so-called “preference rank utility” in which “utility” refers only to an individual’s preference ranking, which is the conventional modern interpretation. There is an older version, “perceptions of satisfaction from preference fulfillment” I’ll mention in a bit.

The main point of interest about “preference rank utility” is that it cannot be meaningfully used in interpersonal contexts because there is no shared individual preference ranking, no shared “utility.” It doesn’t make sense to ask questions like, “Who gets more utility from good G, person 1 or 2?” Or “What is the total utility across person 1 and 2 for good G?” Nor does it make sense to talk about attaching “weights” to one person’s preference ranking, then adding it to another’s. One could make that obvious enough if one stopped using the term “utility,” which in many common interpretations in ethical philosophy may be used in interpersonal contexts, and just used the equivalent statement “preference rank of individual X” or the equivalent. What is the term “utility” meant to be adding beyond a hook on which to hang terminological equivocation and create confusion? An individual preference rank is not of use for some other end in the way goods and services were once meant to be of use or have utility in producing happiness.

Now let’s take up the other, older definition that also works, because I know where some minds are likely going, in the rhetorical circles one associates with bad economics. Say we don’t equate “utility” with individual preference ranks, merely such ranks are the only indicator of something else? Something else? Like what? Happiness? How about the most general formulation of inner, inaccessible states of satisfaction from preference fulfillment to avoid the implication preference ranking must be based on hedonistic happiness but can remain general, not disputable, as theory requires? Fine. Then go ahead and say “utility.” One can see in that case there may be some point in using the term beyond rhetorical chicanery. But as Detective Colombo might remark, I have just a few questions in that case.

One might raise positive issues of course, but let’s cut to the chase and talk about the normative proposition we should maximize “utility.” So one person has a lot more inner sensations of satisfaction than others. Whatever that person wants, that person gets, never mind others. Is that it? And here I must give credit to one of my old economics professors who, obviously using this older definition of “utility,” tried to impress upon a class of listless undergrads how important it was we can’t measure utility, how horrible it would be if we could really maximize social utility. Who would seriously support such an ethical proposition? As far as ethical utilitarianism, it must be the most laughably weak and implausible version around. No one would seriously consider it ethically important or even ethical to implement such a proposition.

Cue the conservative rhetorician chorus, “But that’s the whole point, no one could ever implement it.” So pretend to support a totally implausible ethical proposition because one believes no one could ever implement it? Does it sound sincere to you? Or does it sound misleading rhetoric? Does it sound like they may be just trying to eliminate discussion of more serious ethical utilitarianism in interpersonal contexts in order to set the stage to introduce their own interpersonal ethics? Or to oppose interpersonal ethics, in general? How about if they then proceed to offer normative advice relating to economic policies, objectives, goals that have interpersonal implications? I’m just saying. You’re sure you want to commit to that definition? Not waffle back and forth, equivocate?

My challenge to academic economists: If you mean individual preference ranks only, stop saying “utility.” If you mean inner perceptions of satisfaction, stop claiming you’re doing “individual preference rank utility” and explain why you think that definition of “utility” is ethically plausible. I mean, explain in a rigorous philosophical sense, including the awkward bits. And please not just with the risible line, “I don’t support it, and nor will I defend it; I’m just working out the implications in case anyone else supports it for whatever old reason.” That’s not how it’s used.

If you’re a student, ask for a definition, clarification if you detect linguistic anomalies such as individual preference rank utility discussed in interpersonal contexts or inner state utility discussed as individual preference rank utility. If using the latter, think about the ethics.