I know I just discussed the important concept of ubiquitous “fake distribution indifference” a few weeks ago, but I’ve been meaning for some time to write something on a closely related but I think somewhat more general version of the same concept that involves potential equivocation on different interpretations of what it means to be neutral or indifferent to normative or ethical concerns. Maybe I can get that out of the way this week.
Let me start by observing there is certainly a difference between a normative proposition that supports the status quo for substantive reasons relating to that particular arrangement as the status quo and would not apply to any other potential arrangement were it the status quo, and a normative proposition supporting that same status quo simply because it’s the status quo, a proposition that would apply equally to any other potential arrangement were it the status quo. However, the proposition one should support the status quo simply because it’s the status quo is a normative proposition just as much as a normative proposition that provides substantive reasons for supporting the status quo. It doesn’t represent neutrality or indifference in the broadest sense. It doesn’t represent the absence of normative or ethical propositions.
Furthermore, the normative proposition one should accept the status quo simply because it’s the status quo is a pretty implausible and at least enormously controversial normative proposition, certainly entirely inconsistent with the supposed aim of neoclassical welfare economics to avoid controversial ethical issues that underlies the definition of “utility,” the rendering of distributional issues and ethics exogenous, and indeed the entire ethical half-theory structure of neoclassical welfare economics, where some supposedly uncontroversial ethical issues relevant to evaluating economic systems and outcomes are handled endogenously and other supposedly controversial ones exogenously. What’s so special about the status quo by virtue of it merely being the status quo anyway? Nothing relating to “utility” as defined in neoclassical economics, that’s for sure. Indeed, one can’t help but wonder how many people would sincerely accept such an implausible normative or ethical proposition. “The Queen of the World owns everything, the workers are starving right and left, but that’s the status quo, so I support it, as a point of ethics.” Does that sound ethically uncontroversial to you? Does it sound even remotely plausible as an ethical proposition to you? Because it sounds pretty dodgy to me.
And while it certainly could never be proven, how likely is it anyone who supports the status quo ostensibly merely by virtue of it being the status quo, is actually simply supporting it because they like something about that particular arrangement as the status quo but are too lazy, timid, or disingenuous to express it? Leads to the same result in practice because at the end of the day, one is still supporting the status quo just as if one had introduced particular, concrete reasons for supporting that particular arrangement as the status quo. So why knock oneself out giving particular reasons for supporting the status quo? Why open up one’s ethical reasoning to analysis, criticism, debate? Why not take the easy road? Rhetorically speaking at least, it seems like a no brainer.
But it’s certainly an intriguing conceptual difference or imbalance, isn’t it? No one argues for changes from the status quo based on the normative proposition one should always support changes from the status quo, no matter what those changes may be. People introduce particular normative propositions in support of particular changes, not propositions in support of changes in general. So, and drum roll please because this is finally the point of this post, is supporting the status quo ostensibly simply because it’s the status quo more ethically “neutral” or more indicative of, or consistent with, normative indifference than particular normative propositions supporting particular changes from the status quo? Yes, in one manner of speaking. The proposition is clearly indifferent to particular substantive reasons for supporting the status quo or making particular changes. But in another manner of speaking, no. It’s certainly not neutral with respect to the normative issue of retaining or changing the status quo. And the main point in the context of “fake distributional indifference” in ubiquitous bad economics is that the sense in which that proposition is not neutral is the sense that’s relevant to neoclassical welfare economics. The former sort of “neutrality,” defined with respect to particular substantive reasons for supporting the status quo or particular changes, simply moves one to a less plausible, more controversial ethical or normative position that is also exogenous to neoclassical welfare economics. That’s not what neutrality or indifference to normative or ethical issues means in neoclassical welfare economics. In that respect, fake distribution indifference in bad economics may in some cases be due to underlying terminological equivocation involving different possible senses of what it means to be neutral or indifferent to normative or ethical issues.
One can, of course, support the status quo, such as the status quo mechanism for distributing economic power or the resulting status quo distribution of economic power, on whatever ethical basis one likes, including an implausible love of the status quo simply by virtue of it being the status quo, but one should be honest about it. One should not pretend by doing so one is being consistent with the distributional indifference required by neoclassical welfare economics and, more broadly, one should not pretend one is being neutral or indifferent with respect to the ethical or normative values associated with evaluating economic systems and outcomes including, of course, those associated with the status quo.
