I thought this week I might try to step back and speak to conservatives of the more sincere sort who may be looking for alternatives to bad economics in the conservative style but still want to express the same normative perspectives. I’ve tried to establish as part of my on-going project to clarify what’s going on with bad economics in the conservative style that the “bad” I have in mind pertains to misleading, false, confusing, not “bad” as in normative views I personally reject. Of course, I do have my own normative views, which I’m happy to share, and frequently do, and my normative views are what motivates me to be concerned about misleading bad economics in the conservative style in the first place. However, in terms of addressing my primary concern, bad economics in the conservative style, all I’m trying to do is facilitate the conversation about normative or ethical issues, dispel confusion and unnecessary conflict. The expression of my own normative views is secondary.
I mention often that bad economics in the conservative style is a bait and switch involving neoclassical welfare economics, with one set of normative inputs and factual premises, and other forms of typically applied economics, with another set of normative inputs and factual premises. It often gets the job done in a rhetorical or political sense for conservatives who support the normative views involved. It can shut down critics, render them confused, unable to participate. It often allows conservatives to win the day, but only with low trickery and deceit. Depending on one’s normative views, and in particular one’s normative views relating to expressing truth, one’s intellectual values, one’s views on democracy, one may suppose that’s enough, the policy end justifies the rhetorical means. That’s beyond this tweet storm. However, I suspect some conservatives may be just as satisfied, or more, to argue their positions honestly, directly, forthrightly. They may take the easy path now because it’s there, they see it as benign, they don’t see another path, but they don’t actively prefer it. Viewing the essential problem as the generation or promotion of unnecessary confusion and conflict, inconsistent with one’s intellectual responsibilities and the democratic ethos, in pursuit of expressing certain normative views, let me say a few words about alternative paths.
One category of implicit normative views involves supporting or giving preferential treatment to existing or status quo beliefs, laws, values, arrangements relating to the definition, distribution, or use of economic power to resolve interpersonal conflicts of preferences. A better form of conservative economics would simply say that. “Our normative conclusions are based on existing, status quo, economic power arrangements, whatever they are.” It won’t pretend distributional indifference, restriction to “utility,” lack of ethical controversy, etc. People who perceive potential ethical issues with existing economic power arrangements would then know the theory is not really addressed to them, they will not benefit from studying it, nothing will be gained by engaging with it. Boundaries are drawn. Confusion dispelled. Similarly, people will not be tempted to use that normative argument to then ethically analyze, assess, evaluate the economic power arrangement accepted in that theory as givens, without evaluation, a comically circular argument one sometimes sees in law and bad economics.
Another category of implicit normative views involves the ethics of the distribution of economic power involving labor or capital markets, inheritance, taxes, etc. Some common ones involve marginal productivity, “merit” variously defined, human welfare, rights, fairness, etc. A better form of conservative economics would explicitly propose those ethical views. For example, “We attach normative significance to wages in labor markets because we think they reflect marginal productivity, which we find normatively dispositive for the following reasons …” One could then discuss what “productivity” in that sense means, how it’s defined, how it’s valued, how people come to have different amounts of it, how it relates to other common considerations relating to the distribution of economic power like “merit,” etc. Or if one were more interested in other distributional ethics one sees commonly lurking in the background, “merit” as effort or hard work and / or innate talent and capability, lottery of life and variety or excitement, human welfare, rights, etc., one could talk about those. The important point here is not what form of distributional ethics one may wish to promote but that one does it explicitly, as opposed to pretending distributional ethics are exogenous then ushering them in through the back door, so to speak.
Another category of implicit normative views involves the extent of the market, for example, the belief all interpersonal conflicts of preferences are most ethically resolved on the basis of economic power in markets, that the greater the reach of the market, the better. The ethical issue of the extent of the market is exogenous to neoclassical welfare economics because as a mechanism for resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences, allocating scarce resources, it cannot be addressed using “utility” as defined in that theory. A better form of conservative economics would identify that as an explicit normative proposition that cannot be developed on the basis of “utility.” “We believe all interpersonal conflicts of preferences should be resolved on the basis of economic power in markets.” In that case, people could work out and discuss the implications, for example, “interpersonal conflicts of preferences about who should get the vaccine first should be resolved on the basis of economic power, not medical need.” One can evaluate, assess, discuss, agree or not.
Another category of implicit normative views involves one’s ethical responsibilities to other people when those other people express preferences that appear based in ignorance, irrationality, addiction, fear, psychological manipulation, etc. I’ve discussed before neoclassical welfare economics does not explicitly restrict the maximization of social “utility” as an ethical goal to situations when people are thinking right, but it’s usually evaluated in the Fairy Land with ciphers that do, so it’s a bit opaque. A better form of conservative economics would draw out and stress these contentious issues. For example, “Even if one cannot adequately explain to someone the apple they prefer to eat has been poisoned, one should not interfere.” People could then better understand and evaluate the rest of one’s normative argument or perspective, it’s about respecting the expression of choice, no matter how unfortunate, not someone’s “welfare,” etc. It doesn’t have to be on the sly, hidden, fudged, left studiously vague.
Anyone can follow the Path of Philosophy. It doesn’t require adopting certain normative or ethical views beyond intellectual sincerity and a commitment to the social exchange of one’s true values and ethical beliefs. Take the path. You’ll feel much better.
