Last week, I did a post on the positive versus normative distinction in neoclassical welfare economics, and I mentioned the old 1950s philosophical doctrine of “logical positivism.” I suspect it may be the basis of a rare four tier level issue. Let’s discuss.
Recall a “level issue” for me is where the same or similar issue or issues can arise at different points or levels of a discussion, which can then be conflated or confused with one another to comical effect. An example in neoclassical economics involves subjects tautologically maximizing their “utility” by making choices, while economists advocate for choosing to maximize total social “utility.” Talking about maximizing “utility?” Mind the level to avoid confusion. I’m sure there must be some formal term for what I’m calling a level issue, probably in Latin. Unfortunately I don’t know the proper name, and I can’t be bothered to investigate it just now, so let’s just call it a level issue, shall we?
As I’ve discussed before, neoclassical economics may appear purpose built to generate level issues because of the ease with which one can shift between or combine different perspectives, actors and roles: economist, non-economist observer, theoretical cipher, real subject. For example, I’ve discussed a level issue involving the fact that, because of the restrictive nature of the “utility” used in neoclassical welfare economics, economists qua economists are not meant to express ethics relating to resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences. In a market system, the resolution of interpersonal conflicts of preferences takes place on the basis of economic power, so economists qua economists are not meant to have ethics relating to the definition, distribution, use of economic power. The ostensible rationale for setting those issues aside, rendering neoclassical welfare economics an ethical half-theory, is the desire to avoid the controversial ethical issues associated with resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences.
That issue is logically distinct from whether the theoretical ciphers being studied have preference rankings, and hence “utility,” involving such ethics and living in what they consider an ethical society. Nothing in the definition of “utility” prevents it. They apparently do not, because if they did, interpersonal conflicts of preferences that cannot be resolved on the basis of “utility” would be potentially ubiquitous and would conflict with any normative conclusions economists may wish to make regarding the ciphers. Note this rationale is different from the first rationale, which applied to economists qua economists, to neoclassical welfare economics as a theory. This rationale pertains to subjects in the form of defined, artificial ciphers, and the desire to make theoretical conclusions.
This is one of the issues that arises when one takes “utility” from out the Fairy Land of Economic Theory and its particular unreal restrictions, and tries to plonk it down in reality, where, of course, real subjects have preferences relating to ethics, are not ciphers. That’s what creates issues in the context of the liberal ethos, which suggests laws are typically required to resolve interpersonal conflicts of ethics, while bad economics in the conservative style wrongly interprets neoclassical welfare economics as saying there aren’t any. If you’re keeping track, the issue of theoretical ciphers not having preference rankings relating to the ethics of resolving interpersonal conflict is often discussed under the rubric of “methodological individualism,” where it’s commonly conflated with positive issues. Actually, I suppose that may be a good example of a straightforward issue in the ethical argument presented in normative economics, neoclassical welfare economics, being confusingly associated with issues relating to scientific method in positive economics.
Now by theoretical subjects, ciphers, I meant subjects in roles other than businesspeople qua businesspeople, because they’re famously meant to maximize profit, money, not “utility.” They’re not meant to consider ethics, or preferences about ethics, for yet another reason. The relation of theoretical ciphers in the form of businesspeople qua businesspeople to their real world counterparts may, of course, be different from the relation of other theoretical subjects to their real world counterparts. Real world business may require certain things.
Anyway, that issue, in turn, is logically distinct from whether non-economist observers, distinct in the world of theory from economists qua economists and theoretical ciphers as subjects, may have ethical beliefs relating to resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences. In realistic contexts, as opposed to theoretic contexts, that is to say, in reality as opposed to the Fairy Land, the distinction between “non-economist observer” and subjects, now real people rather than arbitrarily defined theoretical ciphers, breaks down. The conventional take is, yes, of course, non-economist observers are meant to have views on the ethics of resolving interpersonal conflicts and hence about the definition, distribution, use of economic power. Someone must or we simply have a world with no ethics.
However, the suggestion some early twentieth century economist may have been motivated by “logical positivism” in their quest to view normative economics as positive, to make economics a “pure” science, throws that into question and takes us to yet a fourth level of considerations. The logical positivists were fascinated by science to such an extent they famously declared anything not verifiable according to empirical experience, data, such as ethical beliefs, for example, to be literal nonsense. This suggests some may suppose the reason economists are meant to not take up certain ethical issues is not to avoid potential controversy but because ethics is, in fact, nonsense. The same rationale may apply to all actors in all roles, theoretic ciphers and real people. It’s an ultimately nihilistic view, because of course if ethics is nonsense, then the ethics endogenous to neoclassical welfare economics involving “utility” is also nonsense, any argument for certain economic arrangements, market structures, is nonsense. I usually ignore the possibility anyone seriously considers ethics nonsense. Logical positivism exited the building long ago. But might some philosophically clueless purveyors of bad economics still be pursuing the amoral dreams of the old logical positivists? Interesting idea. Do you know enough about neoclassical welfare economics to understand it ignores certain ethical issues relating to resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences? Fine. That’s one level thinking. Which actor, in what role, why, and how is it meant to relate to reality? Confronting anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style means understanding the normative or ethical argument being made in neoclassical welfare economics and how it relates to reality. Lots of funny business in that area. Have a care.
