Maybe this week I can have another go at the positive normative distinction, since I contend without it one can never really hope to come to grips with anti-democracy bad (normative) economics in the conservative style. Sound like fun? Let’s do it then. I’m especially concerned to address a bit of unhelpful bad philosophy, based in perfectly fine but commonly misunderstood philosophy of science from the 1970s, that tends to complicate discussions of bad economics in the conservative style.
Positive propositions relate to observable, empirical phenomenon, facts, statements of what “is.” Normative propositions relate to ultimately subjective values, ethics, statements of what one supposes one “ought” to do. They are fundamentally different sorts of propositions. That distinction is crucial to understanding anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style because the relevant issues involve normative propositions, both those actually in neoclassical welfare economics and those slipped in through the back door in bad economics.
Now in the philosophy of science of the 1970s, at least, a great deal was made of potential normative influences on the conduct of generally positive science in terms of research programs, development, funding, etc., but even at the level of theory evaluation. The points are perfectly valid. Scientists are humans who have normative beliefs, values which may enter into their thinking relating to the everyday conduct of science, what they choose to study, investigate, what they try to ignore, hope to conclude true or false, etc. In general, these interactions may raise the specter of bad science. For example, many medieval scientists were quite interested in establishing the sun traveled around the earth, rather than vice versa, to accommodate religious views having normative implications as well. They gave it a shot, but of course eventually they determined no, actually the earth travels around the sun. That’s how the math worked out. That was reality. Some likely kept trying to work it out differently, but at some point the evidence was overwhelming, science moved on. The point is that the development and conduct of science, including even the evaluation of scientific theory, the degree of evidence required for any group of scientists to move on, accept a result established, may sometimes involve normative considerations.
Did philosophy of science in the 1970s thus suggest no distinction may be made between positive and normative propositions? That ultimately whether the earth goes around the sun or vice versa is just a matter of subjective normative or ethical belief? Of course not. No, it established simply the conduct of ostensibly positive science, addressed to positive, empirical, reality may be influenced by normative considerations, they may interact. That’s all. On the normative or ethical side, one sees even more obvious interaction. An ethical theory will generally involve both factual premises, the truth of which will matter if that theory is meant to be applied in reality, and logic, hence, one may say any applied ethical theory is not purely normative but will contain positive elements as well. Does the presence of positive elements in normative ethical theories meant to establish what one ought to do in some real situation mean there is no distinction between positive and normative propositions? Of course not. Only that applied ethical theories involve both.
The interactions between normative and positive considerations in generally positive science or generally normative ethics is sometimes interpreted to mean one should not identify science as positive, ethics as normative. One sees the technical point, but some care seems wise. What can easily happen if one misstates or overstates the significance of the interactions between positive and normative propositions in science and ethics is one may end up seeming to imply science is ultimately subjective or ethics ultimately objective, empirical. It can also lead to methods of positive evaluation being applied to normative propositions and vice versa, for example, one may lose the distinction between a false but simplifying assumption in a positive theory and a false factual premise in a normative, ethical theory. That sort of confusion between positive and normative is rhetorically quite useful for anyone wishing to hide or draw attention away from the specifically normative or ethical content of neoclassical welfare economics, as well as related bad economics in the conservative style.
Ironically, many critics of bad economics in the conservative style espouse that sort of language because they feel it a useful response to the frequent contention by proponents of bad economics that their normative conclusions are based only on positive science, logic, or math. The argument confusingly conflates a criticism of positive, scientific economics as bad science with a criticism of normative economics, either neoclassical welfare economics or related bad economics in the conservative style, as bad ethical philosophy. Two different issues. Might the conduct of positive economics be influenced in some way by normative considerations? Yes. Does normative economics involve positive factual premises? Yes. Under those conditions, is there any point to distinguishing positive and normative economics? Yes, of course.
Addressing anti-democracy bad economics in the conservative style requires understanding the specifically normative inputs and conclusions of neoclassical welfare economics, how they’re meant to be evaluated given factual premises, contrasting them with those of bad economics. One cannot effectively address bad economics in the conservative style if one conflates the relevant issues in normative, evaluative economics with potential normative elements in the evaluation of positive neoclassical economic theory as predictive science, a different issue.
