I generally discuss the problem of bad economics in the conservative style in the context of interpersonal conflicts of preferences but only rarely in the ostensible no conflict case. However, it causes problems even there. Maybe we can discuss that this week.
The easy case as far as the normative argument expressed in neoclassical welfare economics is when there are no interpersonal conflicts of preferences to resolve and indifference to others’ choices based on their individual preference ranks is meant to be ethically a slam dunk. The idea one has no ethical justification for interfering in another’s behaviors, choices, if they don’t conflict in a sufficiently serious way with one’s own situation or those of others, is a commonly accepted ethical proposition in our society. However, and this is really my theme for today, the issue is not nearly as simple or straightforward in reality as it is in the context of the normative argument of neoclassical welfare economics, ethical propositions meant for what I often call the Fairy Land of Economic Theory. Why? Because neoclassical welfare economics involves the assumptions the ciphers standing for people in that theory are perfectly rational and have perfect information, which essentially eliminate any awkward, potentially problematic cases in that area.
Note in the context of normative economics those assumptions are not presented as factual premises. If they were they could easily be proven false. They’re arbitrary assumptions used to define the context in which the ethical propositions are meant to be considered, evaluated. Note also we’re specifically not discussing positive economics about predicting empirical phenomena. I’ve commented before on the legitimate use of “false but simplifying assumptions” in predictive engineering models, if not social “science,” per se. That’s not our issue today. In the context of normative economics, problems occur when one conflates the Fairy Land for reality, that is, mistakes what in realistic contexts is the ethical half-theory of neoclassical welfare economics for the ethical full-theory of bad economics in the conservative style. These problems notably occur when one considers realistic situations involving people who are not perfectly rational or do not have full information and proposes, discusses, evaluates arguments relating to one’s ethical responsibilities toward those people.
Let’s have an example to consider. I recently watched a TV program about hoarding behavior that included commentary from both a mother, who had suffered severe psychological trauma as a child and likely as a result had developed hoarding disorder, and her adult daughter. The daughter explained she had long resisted becoming involved or trying to intervene in her mother’s situation because she felt it was not her place; it was simply her mother’s preferences, her choices, and she had no real ethical justification to get involved herself. Interestingly, after seeing the results of her non-involvement, observing her mother’s struggles, mental anguish, suffering, she changed her ethical thinking on the issue. She said she now rued the long years of inaction and benign neglect, wishes she had gotten involved sooner. The mother, for her part, was adamant no one else was to blame for her situation and she had simply chosen to engage in hoarding behavior. It was her own volition, her own choice, she insisted over and over again, clearly full of feelings of deep shame and self-loathing. One may see immediately the typical ethical perspective associated with bad economics in the conservative style even without confirmation the case involved a place and social milieu that experience suggests might be particularly susceptible to such rhetoric.
They both developed a new ethical perspective once science entered the room in the form of a psychologist, who explained mental disorders as hoarding were not rational personal choices but often had subconscious psychological origins that must be dealt with on that basis. The ending seemed happy enough. The daughter determined to help her mother more with her issues, and the mother appeared to finally let go of some of the shame and self-hatred that prevented her seeking help. Just one case, obviously, but it seemed to me of wider application. The initial ethical reasoning of mother and daughter are a common enough conservative perspective that could just as easily have been applied outwardly to, say, a homeless person sleeping rough. “Why does she choose to do that? What is it anyone’s business if she lives or dies?” And the homeless person herself, maybe also full of shame, self-hatred, determined to establish to herself and others she accepts full responsibility for her behavior, choices, agreeing she deserves to suffer, but maybe taking something to ease the pain when she can. Any serious ethics must address the fact real people are not fully rational and rarely if ever have full information. It must confront the awkward, difficult cases when people are irrational, mentally unwell, confused, misled, conned, ignorant, addicted, under duress, and so on.
And consider the role of interpersonal conflicts of preferences, so significant in neoclassical welfare economics. Was there not a conflict of preferences between a daughter wishing her mother well and her mother’s preferences under hoarding disorder, a conflict based on love? Is it even sensible in the real world to propose an absence of sentiment toward others in one’s society? To propose no conflict of preferences when one sees another under duress, suffering, possibly ignorant or not thinking correctly, engaged in self harm? I’m not sure it is. So in reality the situation in which no interpersonal conflicts of preferences exist is really just whenever one determines, based on one’s ethics and true factual premises, one should not interfere in another’s behavior. It’s not objective fact but subjective ethical judgment. Here again one may easily lose the plot in reality when thinking of the ethics for the Fairy Land as studied in neoclassical welfare economics. Do the ciphers in the Fairy Land even have preferences about ethics? Are they even meant to have or know about ethics?
Back in reality, one doesn’t care to interfere in another’s behavior, but also one doesn’t care to reject one’s love and concern for those who may be struggling nor allow the strong in some way to prey upon the weak. It’s a bit more complicated than individual preference ranks. Just some things to mull over some cold winter's night: the differences between the Fairy Land and reality, ethical full-theories and ethical half-theories, the normative program of neoclassical welfare economics and of bad economics in the conservative style.
