Some anti-democracy conservatives may suppose authoritarian government stopping voters in democracy “distorting” or “interfering with” markets the epitome of freedom, liberty. Some pro-democracy liberals may suppose the opposite. Let’s discuss that this week.
I suppose the conservative view by far the simpler of the two, so let’s do that first. “People want to do something in existing markets, but voters operating in a democracy use government to prevent it, regulate it, alter it; thus (democratic) government reduces freedom.” I don't suppose I need to say much about that argument as it’s a mainstay of political discourse in the USA, where people frequently expend copious quantities of hot air banging on about “free markets,” the perils of (democratic) government “controlling” the economy, that sort.
For the liberal take, one must first appreciate the role of government power and law in creating markets, making and enforcing laws defining economic power (legal property rights), distributing economic power via markets, inheritance, etc., and using economic power, markets. This issue seems often a great annoyance for many conservatives, who frequently prefer to argue markets do not rest on government power but things like Natural Law, the dictates of divine entities, a mystical meeting of the minds that would hold even without laws, and so on. That enters into the real or utopian anarchism I discuss often enough. For now, let me just say what happens in real anarchy is a rather ugly, violent, brutal affair, and the first thing people in those conditions try to do is make government, law, orderly markets, etc.
The laws of interest here relate to the ethics of economic power I often discuss as exogenous to the ethical half-theory of neoclassical welfare economics that govern how interpersonal conflicts are resolved, where scarce resources go, what is produced, who gets what. The result of any real market hinges directly on prior government decisions, law, expressing someone’s views on the ethics of economic power, defining economic power in some way, distributing it in some way or ways, deciding when markets are appropriate, and so on. This raises the question of who is the exalted someone serving as the ethical arbiter for society on issues relating to economic power, allocating resources, expressed in law? Is it voters in a democracy, or some individual or group of individuals and, if so, why? For conservatives, it’s not an issue. They feel that someone should clearly be them. They or their representatives should be the ethical arbiters of such issues. They suppose they know the objectively correct ethical answers and all others need do is respect, obey those answers. Liberals, in contrast, may be hesitant to associate freedom in any general sense with any real economic system unless ethics and laws governing the use and results of markets are subject to the consent of the governed, no matter how unencumbered market behavior may be thereafter. For example, if some Grand Poobah theologian were to declare that, by Natural Law say, he owns ninety percent of all, but once that’s in place, we should just use markets to resolve any further disputes over resources, a liberal may question if that truly represents freedom. That is to say, liberals may associate with the concept of freedom the ability to express one’s views on ethical issues relating to the definition, distribution, use of economic power in markets. They may disagree freedom is simply accepting the views of autocrats.
Once we get past that issue, we get into an interesting example of a “level issue,” here whether it matters if democratic government addresses the ethics of resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences, allocating resources, one way or another way. Conservatives typically propose a vast ethical difference in democratic government power if voters jump in late in the process and decide, say, a vaccine should be allocated by medical need, after having previously agreed general issues of economic power, conditions for markets. Similarly, for conservatives, there is a vast conceptual difference between deciding the legal rights, mechanisms, that distribute economic power via labor and capital markets, inheritance, whatever, and steps to “re-distribute” that economic power via taxes, policies, whatever. This thinking underlies their distinction between an “activist” democratic government and a “small,” “limited,” or “inactive” democratic government. Both address the same issues, fulfill the same functions, but one does it one way, the other a different way.
Liberals, in contrast, are less prone to see active democratic government an outrage against freedom, and suppose voters who created markets may decide, for whatever reason, to later revise or even not use markets in some contexts. To them, it’s all basically the same issue. For liberals, there’s no essential difference in democratic government being involved at one stage of the process or another, the same ethical issues are involved, about resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences, allocating resources, only the mechanisms differ. For liberals, the same ethical reasoning that applies to laws creating markets may be applied to regulating, revising, or not using markets at all, for whatever reason voters agree, such as so-called “market failures,” or “equity concerns,” or what have you. From the liberal perspective, there’s little substance behind the distinction between a distribution and a “re-distribution” of economic power, and they tend to think more in terms of voters deciding via democracy to distribute economic power in various ways. This generates liberals’ conviction that if the governed, the voters, are prevented by law, authoritarian government power, from expressing their views on the relevant ethical issues, cannot debate, offer opinions, vote on such matters, then they are not truly free. This comports with the US Constitution, which does not prohibit voters from taking up such issues, and allows voters to discuss economics, economic policy, economic goals, and more generally the resolving on interpersonal conflicts of preferences, allocation of scarce resources. In that way, what appears to conservatives as the “freedom” of what I call “small fascism,” authoritarian government limited to expressing conservative views on economic power, markets, economic policy, becomes for liberals a form of tyranny, unfreedom.
Although one can discuss the issues in terms of conflicting ideas of “freedom,” they’re really more directly about who is meant to decide the ethics of resolving interpersonal conflicts of preferences, the allocation of resources, ethics and laws about economic power. The conservative insistence it’s all about their own ostensibly greater interest in “freedom” suggests they’re using the concept as a red herring, similar to using religious “freedom” to support Christo-fascism, state religion, or in the old days “liberty” to support slavery.
